Hellhole Nation: The mirror America refuses to look into – Sanbeer Singh Ranhotra

Opportunity vs Crisis in the US.

The reflexive American assumption that it sits above other societies in the hierarchy of civilisation—that it has earned the right to view the rest of the world as a collection of hellholes from which it extracts talent—is not a position sustained by evidence. It is a posture and an increasingly threadbare one. – Sanbeer Singh Ranhotra 

When conservative radio host Michael Savage described India and China as “hellholes” in a screed about birthright citizenship, it would have been unremarkable—the kind of fringe provocation that bounces around American conservative media most weeks. What made it different was that Donald Trump reposted it on Truth Social, without comment, for his nearly 100 million followers. India’s foreign ministry called it “uninformed, inappropriate and in poor taste”.

This is, in miniature, how the American myth corrodes. Not usually through a single outburst, but through what the powerful choose to endorse and what they choose to ignore. A country that has spent decades marketing itself as a beacon for the talented, the ambitious and the persecuted now has a president who approvingly circulates content describing two of the oldest civilisations on earth as “hellholes”—civilisations that predate the United States by several thousand years, that built universities when Europe was still in its Dark Ages, and that gave the world mathematics, philosophy, and systems of governance that America’s founders openly admired.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in a February 2026 survey of Indian Americans conducted with YouGov, found that 40 per cent—14 per cent frequently and 26 per cent occasionally—have thought about leaving the United States altogether. The most cited reason, mentioned by 58 per cent of those considering departure, was frustration with US politics. Around 54 per cent flagged rising costs of living, and 41 per cent cited safety concerns. These are not recent arrivals with shallow roots. Indian Americans number more than 5.4 million, form one of the most economically productive immigrant communities in the country’s history, and have built careers, companies and families in the US over decades. Their disillusionment, even if not all of them act on it, is worth taking seriously.

The broader pattern the survey documents is arguably more telling than the departure numbers. Nearly a third of respondents said they had stopped discussing politics on social media out of fear of discrimination. One in five reported avoiding leaving and re-entering the United States—a profound chilling effect, given that many Indian Americans on work visas depend on routine international travel. Nineteen per cent said they avoided wearing Indian dress in public. This is a community modifying its visible identity in a country that has built an entire self-image around celebrating visible diversity.

None of this emerged from nowhere. The “nation of immigrants” narrative that America exports—through its culture, its universities, and its diplomacy—has always had a fine-print clause that most immigrants discover only after arrival. The warmth was historically calibrated by origin. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 explicitly barred Chinese labourers. The Immigration Act of 1924 used national origin quotas designed to limit arrivals from Southern Europe, Eastern Europe and Asia while keeping the door open for Northern Europeans. The Bracero Program brought Mexican agricultural workers in to pick American crops, then systematically deported them when the harvest was done. The pattern recurs: welcome the labour, manage the person, and expel the inconvenience.

What has changed in the current period is not the substance of this calculation but its openness. Previous administrations practised selective exclusion through bureaucratic friction—visa backlogs, H-1B uncertainty, and green card queues stretching decades for Indian nationals. The current administration is practising it more plainly. Mass deportation operations, executive orders on birthright citizenship challenged immediately in courts, and rhetoric that frames immigration primarily as a security threat and an economic displacement. The message being sent, whatever the legal outcome of any specific policy, is legible to anyone paying attention.

It is worth pausing on what the “hellhole” framing implies about America’s self-image, because the implicit comparison does not survive scrutiny. In 2024, the K-12 School Shooting Database logged 336 gun incidents on school property in the United States—roughly six or seven per week. Education Week, using the strictest definition of shootings that caused injuries or deaths during school hours, counted 39. Both figures are accurate; they measure different things. But even by the narrowest count, that is more than three incidents a month in which a child was shot at school. Firearms are the leading cause of death for American children and teenagers, ahead of car accidents and cancer—a distinction no other wealthy democracy holds. India and China have serious, well-documented problems. However, they are not countries where parents rehearse active-shooter drills with eight-year-olds before the school day begins.

The reflexive American assumption that it sits above other societies in the hierarchy of civilisation—that it has earned the right to view the rest of the world as a collection of hellholes from which it extracts talent—is not a position sustained by evidence. It is a posture and an increasingly threadbare one.

What the Carnegie survey also reveals, somewhat ironically, is the durability of American pull even under these conditions. When asked to advise a hypothetical professional considering whether to move to the US for work, 62 per cent of Indian American respondents still recommended applying for a US work visa. Dissatisfaction with American politics, in other words, has not yet translated into a wholesale rejection of American opportunity. The country’s universities, its capital markets, its infrastructure for innovation—these remain genuinely formidable. The unease is real, but it coexists with continued engagement.

That coexistence may not last indefinitely. The 40 per cent who have considered leaving skews younger and more educated. Of those contemplating departure, only a quarter named India as their likely destination—most are thinking about Canada, Australia or European countries with more stable immigration environments. This is the talent drain that American business leaders have begun to flag with some urgency to the administration, largely without visible effect. When a country tells its most productive immigrants, repeatedly and in public, that they were never fully welcome, some of them eventually believe it.

The American republic was not built on a graveyard, only metaphorically. Its founding involved the systematic displacement and erasure of Indigenous peoples and the forced labour of enslaved Africans, facts that its founding mythology has worked for two centuries to absorb, minimise or simply talk around. The immigrant narrative that replaced and overlaid that founding story was always conditional—a shifting standard applied differently depending on who was arriving and what the political economy of the moment required.

What is perhaps new now is that the conditionality is being stated so plainly, and at such volume, that it is becoming impossible to bracket as a fringe position. When a sitting president amplifies content describing India as a hellhole, the defence that he was merely reposting someone else’s words is technically true and functionally meaningless. The repost was the endorsement. And for 40 per cent of Indian Americans currently wondering whether the US still has a place for them, the distinction between authorship and amplification is not a comfort. – Firstpost, 25 April 2026

Sanbeer Singh Ranhotra is a columnist for Firstpost, with an interest in world politics and South Asia.

Epstein waits for Trump in Hell

Why Hindu Americans can’t do what Jewish and Muslim Americans can – Surajit Dasgupt

Hindu Americans

The grievance that Hindu Americans do not lobby for India as Jews do for Israel is both premature and misplaced. Diaspora power is earned over generations, not asserted overnight. As Indian Americans mature politically, their challenge will be to balance pride in their roots with the pluralism that defines their adopted homeland. – Surajit Dasgupt

When Shashi Tharoor raised a seemingly provocative question about the global Hindu community’s inability to lobby for India the way Jews in the US advocate for Israel or Muslims campaign for Palestine, he tapped into a long-standing unease within sections of India’s diaspora. His remarks, made at a public event, drew swift responses from several non-resident Indians (NRIs) and persons of Indian origin (PIOs) in America. They countered that India’s decision-makers seldom consult them before taking major policy decisions—such as buying oil from Russia or voting at the United Nations—and that they are often treated merely as emotional extensions of the homeland rather than as stakeholders in policy outcomes.

At one level, the NRI lament is outlandish. No sovereign country consults its overseas citizens before making foreign or economic policy choices. Yet, Tharoor’s pin prick touched a raw nerve because it revealed a deeper question about influence: Why have Hindu Americans, despite their wealth and education, not attained the political leverage that Jewish-Americans enjoy, or the ideological coherence that binds American Muslims on issues like Palestine?

This comparison is not new, but it is newly urgent. Indian-Americans have risen rapidly in visibility over the past two decades, producing senior officials, business leaders and even members of Congress. Still, their collective political voice remains fragmented. To understand why, it helps to explore how other diasporas—particularly Jewish-Americans—built power over generations. That contrast begins with history.

Jewish experience, American integration

Jewish migration to America began in waves through the 19th century, driven by persecution in Europe and the promise of religious freedom. It was not easy, as American Christians were no less swayed by the notion that Jews were the ‘killers’ of Jesus Christ. One thing that the older Americans perhaps did not throw at the Jews is envy. European Christians—as much as Asian Muslims—were jealous of Jews, seeing the Israelites become the first among the followers of the three Abrahamic faiths to become rich, thanks to the business of interest on money considered evil in Christianity and Islam but not in Judaism. There were enough rich men in the capitalist US to resent Jewish riches.

Yet, the early Jewish settlers faced hostility, discrimination and exclusion. If Europe saw Jews portrayed as villains, American cinema portrayed Jews (and Blacks) as villains too.

Examples from classic English literature

  • The Canterbury Tales (c 1400): In “The Prioress’s Tale,” Jewish characters are depicted in a classic antisemitic blood libel, accused of murdering a devout Christian child.
  • The Jew of Malta (1590s): Christopher Marlowe’s play features Barabas, a greedy, treacherous, and murderous character, who helped define the “villain Jew” stereotype on the English stage.
  • The Merchant of Venice (c 1600): William Shakespeare’s Shylock is the most famous example of this archetype. Though given a humanising monologue, he is characterised as a vengeful moneylender who demands a “pound of flesh” and is ultimately forced to convert to Christianity—a “happy ending” for the Christian characters.
  • Oliver Twist (1838): Charles Dickens’s Fagin is a villainous “crafty old Jew” who runs a school for child pickpockets. Dickens initially referred to Fagin as “the Jew” over 250 times, reinforcing the association of criminality with his Jewish identity. After a Jewish reader criticised the portrayal, Dickens removed many of the references in later editions and created a positive Jewish character, Riah, in a later novel.
  • Trilby (1894): George du Maurier’s novel features Svengali, a manipulative Jewish rogue and hypnotist who dominates a young woman. The character was so influential that his name entered the English language as a term for a sinister manipulator.

When film emerged in the 20th century, many of these same stereotypes were transferred to the screen.

  • Antisemitic caricatures: The early 20th century saw the phenomenon of “Jewface,” vaudeville acts that featured exaggerated Jewish stereotypes with props like putty noses and fake beards. Early cinema adapted many of these tropes.
    Nazi propaganda: In the 1930s and 1940s, Nazi Germany weaponised these historical caricatures in its propaganda films to portray Jewish people as satanic, greedy, and inferior.
  • A 1943 production of The Merchant of Venice in Vienna, for example, depicted Shylock as a demonic figure to support Nazi ideology.
  • Controversial adaptations: The 1948 film adaptation of Oliver Twist was denounced by Jewish groups in America for its antisemitic depiction of Fagin, leading to the film’s postponement in the US.
  • The “Jewish American Princess” stereotype: Post-war Jewish male writers, and later cinema, popularised the “JAP” stereotype, portraying young, materialistic, and spoiled Jewish women.

That was until several rights movements in the 1960s forced the American racists to climb down their high horses.

Over time, the Jews in America organised themselves into tight-knit communities centred on synagogues, charities and cultural institutions. From the outset, Jewish immigrants recognised the necessity of solidarity to survive in a majority-Christian society. That solidarity evolved into political coordination.

By the early 20th century, Jewish newspapers, cultural organisations and philanthropic networks had formed a vast informal infrastructure for communal representation. After the horrors of the Holocaust, Jewish activism entered a new phase: moral urgency fused with political strategy. Groups such as the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), and later the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) refined lobbying into an art. They cultivated bipartisan connections, funded research centres and established think-tanks that shaped American opinion about Israel and anti-Semitism.

It took decades of sustained effort. Jewish leaders worked patiently to normalise pro-Israel positions within Washington’s mainstream. When critics today call US Middle East policy “tilted” towards Israel, they overlook how that tilt emerged from generations of community-building, strategic philanthropy and civic participation. The result is not merely influence over foreign policy but a broad societal sympathy for Jewish concerns—a by-product of cultural immersion through education, arts and civil rights movements.

Muslim identity, shared faith

The Muslim-American story is very different but equally instructive. Muslims in the US are far more ethnically diverse—comprising Arabs, South Asians, Africans and converts—yet they have gradually coalesced around faith-based advocacy. Their political influence is still evolving, but organisations such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) have given them a public voice.

The Palestinian issue provides a coherent moral and political framework to all Muslims in the US, transcending their respective nationalities, with their advocacy prioritising a global Muslim identity. This communal psychology contributes to their emotional unity. Not the case with the Hindu-American community! Predominantly Indian in origin, Hindus in the US represent a single country but lack an equivalent unifying ideology. Moreover, if individually, Indians constitute no more than 1% of the American population—too small for lobbying—and Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, or Arabs are fewer than Indians, the Islamic collective makes up for the absence of a large number of migrants from one given country.

As a saving grace, Indian-Americans are hardly casteist and their separate denominations—like Vaishnava, Shaiva, Shakta, Smartha, etc—do not manifest in the US to the point where Hindu unity would become a tough ask. However, India’s internal political polarisation often spills into the diaspora, dividing Indian-Americans between secular liberals and those aligned with the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

Indian-American paradox

Indian-Americans are among the most prosperous ethnic groups in the United States, with high median incomes and remarkable educational attainment. Silicon Valley, academia and medicine are full of Indian success stories. Yet political power does not automatically follow economic success. Unlike Jewish or Muslim groups, Indian-Americans have not built long-term institutions for coordinated lobbying. The existing organisations—such as the US-India Political Action Committee (USINPAC) or the Hindu American Foundation (HAF)—operate in silos and often struggle for mainstream acceptance.

There is also a generational factor. The first wave of Indian immigrants in the 1960s and 70s arrived under professional visas, focused on assimilation and career advancement. Political activism was rare. Their children, more culturally confident and socially integrated, are beginning to enter politics—figures such as Pramila Jayapal, Ro Khanna, and Vivek Ramaswamy illustrate this new visibility—but ideological divisions persist. Jayapal’s left-leaning stance on India’s human rights record often clashes with the nationalist sentiment of conservative Hindus. Consider how desperate Ramaswamy was during the Trump campaign to prove Hinduism isn’t too un-Christian, after all!

Most awkwardly, Hindus under the overseas wings of the Sangh Parivar need to work in coordination with Pakistani and Indian Muslims—including with CAIR and ISNA activists—in the US so that the South Asian identity looks significant and prominent enough to pressure the American policy makers.

Even symbolic recognition has come slowly. When one American state declared October 2022 as the “Hindu Heritage Month”, it was celebrated as a milestone. But as the activists who pushed for it admitted, Hispanics took nearly three decades to achieve comparable recognition. Diaspora influence takes time—and unity.

Politics of access, perception of influence

The optics of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s warm rapport with Donald Trump during the latter’s first presidency created an illusion of extraordinary Indian-American influence. The “Howdy Modi” rally in Houston in 2019, where the two leaders walked hand in hand before a cheering crowd, suggested that the community had arrived as a political force. Yet that perception was misleading. It reflected personal chemistry, not institutional power.

When Trump returned to office for a second term, expectations of deeper India-US alignment quickly met geopolitical reality. Washington’s interests in China, trade and global security do not shift with diaspora enthusiasm. The limits of Indian-American leverage became clear, underscoring how different it is from the entrenched Jewish lobby or even the organised Muslim advocacy on Palestine and civil rights.

Long road to influence

Diaspora influence, as history shows, matures over generations. The Jewish experience offers the clearest example. From the early 20th century to the post-Holocaust era, Jewish-Americans worked through education, philanthropy and coalition-building. They forged alliances with African-Americans during the civil rights movement, ensuring moral reciprocity when they later defended Israel’s legitimacy. Their activism was institutional, not episodic.

For Indian-Americans, such institutional continuity is still forming. The community’s philanthropic energies are vast but scattered. Major donors fund temples, educational foundations and disaster relief, yet few invest strategically in think-tanks or policy advocacy. Nor is there consensus on which issues to champion. Should lobbying focus on India’s image, on global Hindu identity, or on broader multicultural representation? Each objective attracts different constituencies, often at cross purposes.

Cultural perception, historical memory

Then, influence does not depend on money or access alone; your narrative is an edifice built upon the foundation of the memories of your community as a collective. For Jewish-Americans, the memory of persecution provided a moral foundation for activism. Anti-Semitism in Western literature and film gradually gave way to empathy and representation, transforming public attitudes. Today, Jewish characters in American media are complex, human and often central to moral storytelling. This cultural normalisation underpins political legitimacy.

Indian-Americans, by contrast, are still defining their narrative. The Western imagination often reduces India to stereotypes of spirituality or poverty. Despite recent Bollywood popularity and the global reach of Indian cuisine, the Hindu identity remains poorly understood. Worse, political controversies—over caste, majoritarianism or Kashmir—have made the term “Hindutva” contentious abroad, complicating outreach efforts.

Future of diaspora advocacy

If Indian-Americans are to build real influence, they must learn from the patience and organisation of their Jewish counterparts. Effective lobbying requires consensus, credible institutions and a shared sense of purpose beyond partisan divides. It also demands bridging the gap between India’s domestic politics and the pluralist expectations of American democracy.

For now, the community’s most powerful asset remains its credibility: hardworking professionals with high civic participation and low crime rates. Translating that respectability into political leverage will take time—and strategic discipline.

The grievance that Hindus do not lobby for India as Jews do for Israel is, therefore, both premature and misplaced. Diaspora power is earned over generations, not asserted overnight. As Indian-Americans mature politically, their challenge will be to balance pride in their roots with the pluralism that defines their adopted homeland.

Tharoor’s question, then, was less an accusation than an invitation—to imagine what an organised, confident and inclusive Indian-American voice could achieve if it learned from history. – News18, 15 October 2025

Surajit Dasgupta is a senior journalist and writer.

Hinduphobia