Tagore’s Jana Gana Mana: How a British lie became India’s most persistent myth – Samik Bhattacharya

April 17, 2026VOI

Jana Gana Mana was neither written for King George V nor sung in his honour. The misconception arose in the overlap between the Congress leadership’s eagerness to ingratiate themselves with the visiting monarch and the British propaganda apparatus, always poised to exploit an opportunity. – Samik Bhattacharya

Even today, many still fall for the British-spawned myth about Jana Gana Mana, a song that was always an ode to India’s soul. How did such a distortion come into being? It arose from the convergence of two forces: the Congress leadership’s eagerness to ingratiate themselves with the Emperor, and the calculated manoeuvring of the British propaganda apparatus. At the time, several Congress leaders wished that Rabindranath Tagore compose a song in honour of King George V, to be performed at the Congress session.

In the ceaseless churn of falsehood, even gods may fall from grace, so goes the old saying. But fewer know that, in a similar vortex of falsehood, Rabindranath Tagore himself was once cast as a “British loyalist.” The irony is that the old Congress ought to have known better, for it was their silent complicity that allowed the British press to malign Tagore so effectively. One hundred and fourteen years have passed, and yet that slander still drifts through our collective memory as a stubborn myth. Many continue to be ensnared by it; a Member of Parliament was its most recent victim. But the BJP, as a party, has never endorsed the notion that Tagore composed Jana Gana Mana Adhinayaka Jaya Hey in praise of King George V.

The year was 1911. From 26 to 28 December, the Indian National Congress held its session in Calcutta. It was there that Jana Gana Mana was first sung publicly. On the morning of 27 December, accompanied by Dinendranath Tagore’s musical arrangement and performed by a chorus of young boys and girls, the song resonated through the Congress pavilion.

It is true that King George V was visiting India at that time. But the song was neither written for him nor sung in his honour. How, then, did this misconception arise? It germinated in the overlap between the Congress leadership’s eagerness to ingratiate themselves with the monarch and the British propaganda apparatus, always poised to exploit an opportunity.

Many Congress leaders, wishing to please the Emperor, wanted Rabindranath to write a song honouring George V for the Congress session. This proposal reached Tagore through the barrister and Congress leader Ashutosh Chaudhuri. He was annoyed and indeed disappointed. He had no objection to writing a song for the Congress session, but to write one in praise of George V, he flatly refused.

And so, two songs were sung that day: in the morning, Tagore’s Jana Gana Mana Adhinayaka Jaya Hey; in the evening, Badshah Hamara, composed by Rambhaja Dutta Chowdhuri. A glance at their language makes it immediately clear which song lauded the Emperor and which did not.

Rambhaja Dutta Chowdhuri, a Congress leader from Punjab, happened to be Tagore’s nephew-in-law, married to Sarala Devi Chaudhurani. Since Tagore would not grant the request routed through Ashutosh Chaudhuri, another Congress leader within the extended family took up the task and composed a loyal hymn for the British “Badshah.”

If this is what truly occurred, how then did the contrary myth take root? It was, quite simply, a British stratagem. The morning after Jana Gana Mana was sung at the Congress session, three English newspapers—including The Statesman and The Englishman—published identical claims that Tagore had written the song in honour of King George V. All three were faithful mouthpieces of the colonial regime. Their synchronised reports forged a falsehood that, over time, solidified into “truth.” Thus, an empty fiction grew into a vast national myth, still alive in our discourse today. Even in independent India, several eminent figures repeated this error, unaware that they were only echoing a lie crafted by the British.

Tagore himself attempted more than once to correct the distortion. On 20 November 1937, in Bichitra, and again on 29 March 1939, in Purbasha, he wrote with a mixture of pain and indignation, compelled to dismantle the persistent falsehood. He confessed that he felt insulted by such wilful misinterpretation. “I did not write this song for any George the Fifth or George the Sixth,” he stated unequivocally. The song, he clarified, was dedicated to those eternal, illumined spirits who had guided India since the dawn of civilisation. Yet, despite his own testimony, the slander survived.

In the 1990s, I myself intervened to save a political colleague from repeating the same old error. I was then active in the youth wing of the party. At a national event, I heard someone invoke the fable linking Jana Gana Mana to George V’s visit to India. I corrected him on the spot. L.K. Advani was present on that very stage. Yet even today, some continue to perpetuate the mistake.

A carefully researched essay by MP Sukhendu Sekhar Roy also sets forth the true facts. The piece rests on firm documentary evidence. Another work, Jatiyo Sangeet-er Utso Sondhane, sheds further light on the matter. Anyone in doubt may consult these sources.

Let me restate the essence plainly. On the evening of 27 December 1911, Badshah Humara was sung at the Congress session in honour of King George V. But that morning, Jana Gana Mana, sung at the very same venue, had no connection whatsoever to the Emperor. Just as the “Aryan invasion theory” is an unverified myth, so too is the claim that Tagore composed his song for George V. Many remain afflicted by this myth. But as a party, we do not endorse it; it has never been our agenda.

And to those now raising a hue and cry over the personal opinion of one BJP MP, do they remember what their own party once did to Tagore after the Jallianwala Bagh massacre?

When news of the atrocity reached him, Tagore wished to travel to Punjab with Mohandas Gandhi. He sent a messenger, but Gandhi did not respond. Tagore then urged Chittaranjan Das to organise a protest meeting in Kolkata. Chittaranjan Das asked whether Tagore would preside. Tagore agreed. Later, he was asked whether he would deliver the principal address. He agreed again. Then Chittaranjan Das suggested that Tagore himself should organise the meeting. Irritated and disillusioned, Tagore ceased further communication with the Congress leaders. Instead, he renounced his knighthood, turning his protest into a thunderous moral gesture that echoed across the world. – News18, 5 December 2026

› Samik Bhattacharya is the BJP WB President and Rajya Sabha MP.

2 – Was India’s knowledge elitist? – Michel Danino

April 13, 2026April 13, 2026VOI

Thomas Babington Macaulay … declared that traditional Indian knowledge consists of “false history, false astronomy, false medicine … in company with a false religion”, many Indian academics and intellectuals have implicitly or explicitly accepted that knowledge from the West is the real thing. – Prof. Michel Danino

Indian civilization’s obsession with knowledge was our last “master idea,” with endless and still poorly explored contributions in nearly every field (“India as a Knowledge Creator”). But there is another side to the story, which in many ways characterizes the paradox of Indian culture.

No Indian university, IIT or IIM has a regular, comprehensive course on Indian knowledge systems (IKS) (though IIT Gandhinagar made a beginning a few years ago). There are, no doubt, a few scattered courses on systems of ancient science (IIT Bombay and Kharagpur), and a few universities teach courses on Indian philosophical systems or even “Indology”, whatever that means. By and large, however, indifference, neglect, or hostility to IKS is the rule.

All three are part of India’s colonial legacy: ever since Thomas Babington Macaulay, a powerful British figure of the first half of the nineteenth century, declared that traditional Indian knowledge consists of “false history, false astronomy, false medicine … in company with a false religion”, many Indian academics and intellectuals have implicitly or explicitly accepted that knowledge from the West is the real thing.

Our philosophy courses cover mostly European philosophy; the same goes with psychology (from which yogic systems of self-knowledge are generally excluded); contemporary Indian literature is often studied; classical texts rarely are. Students of Ayurveda are compelled to devote much time to modern medicine, but not vice versa. Political scientists generally know nothing of the systems of polity that prevailed in ancient India. And so forth. In 1946, the freedom-fighter and statesman K.M. Munshi wrote: “Modern education in India assumes that Indian culture is dead, only requiring post-mortem dissection, and that a new culture can be developed by imitating the West. No attention is paid to the importance of a ceaseless reintegration.”

That accounts for the indifference and neglect. But why hostility? I see it essentially as a survival of the colonial-cum-missionary stereotype that Indian knowledge systems were “elitist”, “upper caste” when not “Brahminical”, and denied to the lower castes and “untouchables”. Such declarations are usually based on a few Dharma Shastra texts prohibiting the teaching of the Vedas to lower castes. Granted, those texts and a few more were Brahminical and set down a caste-based order for the society.

However, the said society was far from circumscribed or defined by a few orthodox texts. A careful look at the mechanisms of transmission of knowledge gives a very different picture. “Brahminical” texts of mathematics produced number systems and calculation methods that were, in time, adopted by the population at large, down to the carpenter and the farmer. Astronomy created calendars that punctuated people’s lives and stood behind astrology and the ever-popular panchangas (almanacs).

Architecture was rooted in Vedic principles but practised by Vishvakarmas: technically Shudras, they often regarded themselves as higher than the Brahmins in their application of those concepts to temple construction and iconography (for the making of bronze or stone images), and themselves wrote manuscripts in both Sanskrit and regional languages. So too, texts of medicine, metallurgy, agriculture, animal and plant treatment, water management and other civil engineering techniques, were often written by the practitioners of those disciplines rather than by “upper caste” theoreticians.

All this points to a sustained, intense and complex dialogue between the Shastras (the theories or systems) and the popular practices (loka parampara). From the Ayurvedic classic which declares that for the knowledge of medicinal plants one should consult the hunter or the tribal, to Kautilya’s Arthashastra which explains how the quality of a metal ore is to be assessed through its taste and smell, this dialogue has clearly enriched the two sides, if at all there are sides. In literature and the arts, it is the much-discussed marga-desi interplay, or classic (generally pan-Indian and Sanskritic) vs. popular (regional and often non-Sanskritic) texts and art forms. Again, it is a story of mutual enrichment, with classical forms often emerging from popular ones and eventually influencing them back. This is perceptible in the epic genre (Mahabharata and Ramayana), in all performing arts (drama, dance, music), and in sculpture. A scholar friend of mine has compared this interaction to the double helix of the DNA molecule; as the helices, though joined by numerous bridges, never meet, I prefer the symbol of Hermes’s caduceus with its two intertwined snakes.

In 1920, Sri Aurobindo wrote to his younger brother, “I believe that the main cause of India’s weakness is not subjection, nor poverty, nor a lack of spirituality or Dharma, but a diminution of thought-power, the spread of ignorance in the motherland of Knowledge. Everywhere I see an inability or unwillingness to think—incapacity of thought or ‘thought-phobia’.” The last term perfectly applies to our cultural negationists of the day. Indian knowledge systems were not “elitist” or exclusivist, even if specialized fields did exist for the various castes. Overall, while they invoked lofty concepts, they were often remarkably pragmatic. No, they did not tell us how to construct vimanas or nuclear weapons; instead, they sought to equip the society with all the tools it needed for a complete development in the material, aesthetic, intellectual, ethical and spiritual fields. – The New Indian Express, 31 December 2018

› Prof. Michel Danino is a French-born Indian author, scholar of ancient India, and former educator at IIT Gandhinagar.

1 – India as a knowledge creator – Michel Danino

April 12, 2026April 13, 2026VOI

The India that was a creator of knowledge, has become a consumer rather than a supplier in the market. Two centuries of colonial dominance certainly played a part, but we have enjoyed seven decades of independence. Clearly, as a nation we have not done justice to Indian knowledge systems, which no Indian university teaches today except in bits and pieces. – Prof. Michel Danino

Launched with great fanfare in 2005, India’s National Knowledge Commission claimed to work “towards a Knowledge Society”, an objective which Dr. Manmohan Singh, then prime minister, repeated on many public platforms. It sounded quite noble, but few noticed how it implied that India was not yet a “knowledge society”, and perhaps never was one. Paradoxically, such a statement reflects a profound ignorance of the cult of—almost obsession for—knowledge in pre-modern India.

Indeed, India is the only ancient civilisation where knowledge was deified, with the honour going to Sarasvati. (Other cultures’ pantheons did often include knowledge, but only as a peripheral attribute.) Now, this fine move perhaps does not take us very far in practice—how do we assess whether knowledge was genuinely worshipped, or at least revered? We have a choice of methods; two will help us here, deviating from the stock answer that “Veda” comes from vid, or “knowledge”, that Upanishads view the knowledge of the Self as the highest knowledge, or that moksha is really liberation from ignorance—an objective shared by the Buddha. All that is fine, and perhaps essential; in the nineteenth century, however, it helped stereotype Indians as being “contemplative” or “otherworldly.” Let us be, therefore, crudely empirical.

A first answer comes from estimates of the number of manuscripts available in Indian libraries, repositories or private collections. They run into millions, with the U.S. scholar David Pingree once reaching an educated guess of 30 millions. This figure is but a tiny fraction of the mass of production over the last three millenniums, since numerous texts disappeared owing either to destruction (Nalanda’s library is an oft-cited case), the vagaries of time, neglect or obsolescence. A tiny fraction, again, of this figure has been published, and a much tinier fraction translated into some other language. We are therefore judging the mass of knowledge created in India by the tip of the tip of the proverbial iceberg.

What do those manuscripts deal with? Every topic under the Indian sun: philosophies, systems of yoga, grammar, language, logic, debate, poetics, aesthetics, cosmology, mythology, ethics, literature of all genres from poetry to historical tradition, performing and non-performing arts, architecture, mathematics, astronomy, astrology, chemistry, metallurgy, botany, zoology, geology, medical systems, governance, administration, water management, town planning, civil engineering, ship making, agriculture, polity, martial arts, games, brain teasers, omens, ghosts, accounting, and much more—there are even manuscripts on how to preserve manuscripts! The production was colossal and in almost every regional language (with, expectedly, Sanskrit having the lion’s share).

The second answer comes from formal or informal educational institutions, the humble gurukula or the large Buddhist monasteries. A great concern in imparting knowledge—both inner and outer—is perceptible through a number of texts and inscriptions, and struck several European travellers to India. The Italian writer and musician Pietro Della Valle reported in 1623, during his journey across Asia, “They [Indians] are particularly anxious and attentive to instruct their children to read and to write. Education with them is an early and an important business in every family.” Two centuries later, Bishop Reginald Heber, who spent a few years in India, noted, “The Hindus are brave, courteous, intelligent, most eager for knowledge and improvement.”

If India was such a creator of knowledge, how has it become a consumer rather than a supplier in this market? Two centuries of colonial dominance certainly played a part, but have we not enjoyed seven decades of independence? Clearly, as a nation we have not done justice to Indian knowledge systems, which no Indian university today teaches, except for a fragment here and a snippet there. Many scholars, Indian and non-Indian alike, have flagged this debilitating lack of self-confidence in our creative abilities, and have demanded a place for the best of classical knowledge to be given due place in our academic spaces—to no effect as yet.

Exactly a hundred years ago, Sri Aurobindo wrote: “When we look at the past of India, what strikes us … is her stupendous vitality, her inexhaustible power of life and joy of life, her almost unimaginably prolific creativeness. For three thousand years at least—it is indeed much longer—she has been creating abundantly and incessantly, lavishly, with an inexhaustible many-sidedness, republics and kingdoms and empires, philosophies and cosmogonies and sciences and creeds and arts and poems and all kinds of monuments, palaces and temples and public works, communities and societies and religious orders, laws and codes and rituals, physical sciences, psychic sciences, systems of yoga, systems of politics and administration, arts spiritual, arts worldly, trades, industries, fine crafts—the list is endless and in each item there is almost a plethora of activity.” But that was in the past; the “inexhaustible many-sidedness” seems exhausted.

Even when India’s contribution to knowledge is somehow acknowledged, it has often been characterised as “elitist”: it was reserved, we are told, for the social elite and denied to the lower castes or the casteless. Does this serious charge withstand scrutiny? This will be the object of our next exploration, and our next master idea of Indian civilisation. – The New Indian Express, 29 November 2018

› Prof Michel Danino is a French-born Indian author, scholar of ancient India, and former educator at IIT Gandhinagar.

Confronting the many faces of Hinduphobia in the West – Arun Anand

April 9, 2026VOI

Hindus in the West continue to face hostility, misrepresentation, and institutional indifference. They also raise serious questions about the rhetoric of diversity and inclusion in many Western societies. To address Hinduphobia, it is important that global academic, media, and policy discourses approach Hindus and their faith with fairness, intellectual honesty, and sensitivity. – Arun Anand

A series of disturbing events in the Western world have once again brought the issue of Hinduphobia to the fore. The latest incident is an attack on a Holi celebration in Harrow in the United Kingdom.

An X post by UK Insight, a well-known public advocacy group in the UK, gave details of this incident. It said: “Local Hindu families, including women and children, gathered to celebrate peacefully. What should have been a happy occasion was disrupted when a group of Muslim youths reportedly came from a nearby mosque and attacked the event, pushing over speakers and attempting to intimidate those celebrating. After initially leaving, they returned with around 20 others and began attacking members of the gathering. Police were called and arrived approximately an hour later, taking statements from those present.”

The UK Insight group flagged this incident, emphasising: “No one celebrating a religious festival in Britain should face intimidation or violence. The right to celebrate our faith peacefully is fundamental and must be protected equally for all communities. We demand that the authorities investigate this incident thoroughly and ensure accountability. Community harmony cannot be built on silence when one group is targeted. Hindus in the UK deserve the same safety, dignity and protection as everyone else.”

It may be recalled that the UK witnessed riots in Leicester in September 2022, where Muslim mobs went on the rampage targeting Hindus after an India-Pakistan cricket match.

Incidentally, a recent report that emerged from the United Kingdom made wide-ranging allegations against the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and its ideology of Hindutva in the context of these riots, while brushing the role of Muslim mobs under the carpet. Hindus, who were the victims of these riots, have been mischievously projected as the perpetrators. The report titled “Understanding the 2022 Violence in Leicester” was funded by known Hindu and India baiter George Soros through his notorious Open Society Foundation.

The report was jointly authored by the School of Oriental and African Studies, the London School of Economics and Political Science, and The Monitoring Group. The fact of the matter is that the RSS functions only in India, and yet Hindus and their philosophy were targeted in this report by dragging in the name of the RSS without any evidence.

According to the New Delhi-based think tank Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies, “A central analytical weakness of the report lies in the disconnect between what it descriptively documents and what it prescriptively recommends: it records intimidation, property damage, temple-targeting, and anti-Hindu harm, yet its principal recommendations are directed towards identifying, isolating, and confronting Hindu ideological formations.”

It further adds: “By elevating “Hindutva extremism” into the core policy category, the report risks institutionalising a framework in which Hindus are acknowledged as having suffered harm but are nevertheless rendered the primary object of institutional suspicion, monitoring, and civic management.

The report itself acknowledges verification limits in relation to some of its most politically consequential claims, including alleged involvement of Hindutva-associated actors in the 17 September march and unsupported attributions such as references to ‘Hindutva RSS thugs’. These admissions materially weaken any strong causal inference linking Leicester’s violence to organised Hindutva structures.”

Read as a whole, the report does not merely analyse Leicester; it helps construct an official-sounding interpretive framework in which anti-Hindu harms are acknowledged but subordinated to a broader narrative of Hindu ideological risk. The result is a form of institutionalised asymmetry with implications for safeguarding, equality recognition, media discourse, and the public understanding of Hinduphobia in Britain, says the CIHS’ detailed analysis of this report.

In another incident, the Harvard University’s South Asian Studies Department used derogatory images to promote the department’s Elementary Sanskrit course.

After the Coalition of Hindus of North America (COHNA) objected to these images, the department apologised and withdrew them. According to a report in Harvard’s student newspaper The Harvard Crimson, the official statement from the department read: “The South Asian Studies Department deeply regrets the posting of an insensitive image in relation to our Sanskrit programme. … As a department, we have a long and celebrated history of teaching Sanskrit, and we remain committed to teaching the language and the great intellectual and cultural tradition it carries.”

The Harvard Crimson quoted Pushpita Prasad, chief of communications at the Coalition of Hindus of North America, as saying: “It is very rare for practising Hindus and mainstream Hindu organisations to be consulted on Hinduism.”

These incidents point to a pattern where Hindus in the West continue to face hostility, misrepresentation, and institutional indifference. They also raise serious questions about the rhetoric of diversity and inclusion in many Western societies. In contrast, reality often reveals a gap between principle and practice. To address Hinduphobia, it is important that global academic, media, and policy discourses approach Hindus and their faith with fairness, intellectual honesty, and sensitivity. – News18, 11 March 2026

› Arun Anand is an author, journalist, columnist and broadcaster.

The sacred fire at Baku – Sandeep Balakrishna

April 4, 2026April 4, 2026VOI

The Jvalaji Temple was built in 1745 near Baku. It quickly became a venerated site of pilgrimage. Hindus and Sikhs from India undertook tirtha yatra to Azerbaijan at great cost and risk. – Sandeep Balakrishna

When Will Durant wrote “most of us spend too much time on the last twenty-four hours and too little on the last six thousand years,” he was restating a truth about the importance of keeping history afresh in memory.

This 6,000-year time travel takes us back to an India which had evolved a flourishing maritime culture and had left its imprint overseas. David Frawley in his Gods, Sages and Kings, and Michel Danino in his The Lost River: On the Trail of the Sarasvati show that the ancient Vedic civilisation was a maritime civilisation. Likewise, pioneering historian S. Srikanta Sastri (1904-74) marshalled a wealth of evidence that testified to the seafaring element in the Vedic zeitgeist.

This maritime contact of India with the rest of the world was a continuous and positive force for transnational economic and cultural exchange. It remained unabated till the waves of Islamic invasions disrupted it. It is also, sadly, an understudied area of Indian history, which had been spearheaded in the late 19th century and continued till about 1950. Notable works in the field include Radha Kumud Mukherjee’s Indian Shipping: A History of Seaborne Trade and Maritime Activity of the Indians from the Earliest Times, R.C. Majumdar’s Classical Accounts of India, Ancient Indian Colonies in the Far East, India and South-East Asia and Moti Chandra’s Trade and Trade Routes in Ancient India. These apart, V. Raghavan and Vasudeva Sharan Agarwala’s scholarly anthologies explore the influence of India’s artistic, musical and theatrical traditions in foreign lands.

Three random examples can illustrate this.

Pliny the Elder (24 CE-79 CE) was mortified at how copiously the Malabar black pepper was draining the Roman exchequer; he branded India as the “sink of precious metals” that Rome supplied as exchange to buy pepper.

In the second century CE, a Greek artist had engraved an image of Bharat Mata on a silver dish discovered at Lampsacus (now Lapseki in Turkey) during an archaeological dig in 1847.

The Balinese dramatic art form known as Wayang Beber, performed by the artist known as Dalang, is a song narrative in which he unfolds sheets cloth embossed with miniatures of scenes from the Ramayana and the Mahabharata and narrates each story depicted therein.

Among all foreign lands, Brihad Bharata—known as Southeast Asia—shows the densest imprint of Hindu culture and traditions. In R.C. Majumdar’s words: “The Indian colonies in the Far East must ever remain as the high-water mark of maritime and colonial enterprise of the ancient Indians. … Political conquest … was rapidly followed by a complete cultural conquest. The local people readily assimilated the new civilisation and adopted the religion, art, social manners and customs, literature, laws … of the conquerors. … A new India was established in that far-off region. … We find new towns and countries called Ayodhya, Kaushambi, Srikshetra, Dvaravati, Mathura. … So long as the Hindu dynasties were in power the civilisation flourished. … The descendants of men who founded that empire abandoned sea-voyage as something unholy and thus an impassable barrier was created between the Hindus and their brethren of the Far East.”

Moti Chandra’s Trade and Trade Routes in Ancient India is perhaps the most thorough treatise on the prowess of Hindu maritime and cultural proselytisation that carried the best of Hindu culture to Southeast Asia, Russia, Turkey, Greece and Rome. In his foreword to this work, V.S. Agarwala opens an evocative world before us: “In the travellers besides the merchant community were included monks, pilgrims, pedlars, horse traders, acrobats and actors, students and tourists. … Indian travellers by land and sea routes, were also the carriers of Indian story literature. Seamen often related miraculous stories of Yakshas, Nagas, demons and spirits and aquatic animals connected with the seas. These stories diverted the people during their travels; such stories were adopted by literature as motifs as well.…”

Indeed, every great Hindu empire in the classical and post-classical period was also a formidable naval power—from the Maurya to the Gupta and the Rashtrakuta, the Chola and the Vijayanagara empires.

With the establishment of Muslim power in India, this spread of Hindu culture abroad received an almost irrecoverable blow. However, the entrepreneurial spirit of Hindus refused to remain caged. While sultans wielded despotic and bigoted political power, they depended on Hindu business classes to keep their finances well-oiled. In turn, these classes found creative ways to preserve their Dharma and traditions both in India and abroad.

In the 16th century, groups of Sindhi Bhatiyas migrated to the Persian Gulf and settled in Muscat; they were later followed by Kutchi Banias. For the next two centuries, they acquired unchallengeable financial clout and became confidants of the successive sultans of Oman. They even had a decisive say in deposing one sultan and installing another. They built temples, celebrated all major Hindu festivals and sent prasad to the sultan himself. It was not a coincidence that Narendra Modi visited the in Muscat in 2018. It had been built by a Sindhi Bhatia sometime in the 19th century.

A similar but lesser-known cultural stamp left by migrant Hindu businessmen is found in Baku, Azerbaijan. This is the Jvalaji Temple built in 1745. Today, it is simply known as the Ateshgah of Baku.

Brisk trade had existed between India and the region for at least three centuries prior to the Russo-Persian war of 1722. A sizeable community of Hindu and Sikh businessmen—merchants, traders and bankers—had settled in Bokhara, Samarkand and Azerbaijan. However, the Russian invasion didn’t hamper commerce in a significant way.

After the Jvalaji Temple was built, it quickly became a venerated site of pilgrimage. Hindus and Sikhs from various parts of India undertook tirtha yatra at great risk. European travellers of the era testify as to how “… These poor devotees … come on a pilgrimage from their own country. … They mark their foreheads with saffron, and have a great veneration for a red cow. … [I] met two Hindoo Fakirs who announced themselves as on a pilgrimage to this Baku Jawala Ji. … Where a Hindoo is found so deeply tinctured with the enthusiasm of religion, that though his nerves be constitutionally of a tender texture and his frame relaxed by age, he will journey through hostile regions from the Ganges to the Volga, to offer up prayer at the shrine of his God.…”

As its name clarifies, the Jvalaji Temple is a shrine dedicated to Agni. Seven sacred fires used to burn from seven holes within the enclosure of the temple. This was the original garbhagriha. In the Vedic pantheon, Agni is conceived as having seven “tongues” (sapta jihva) or flames.

The temple complex houses 17 inscriptions of which 14 are in Sanskrit (both Nagari and Devanagari), two in Gurumukhi and one in Farsi. The very first inscription contains an invocation of Ganesha, beginning with “Sri Ganesaya Namah.” Then it describes the glory of the Jvalaji deity, narrating its miraculous powers. Another inscription is an elaborate stuti, or praise of Shiva.

In his History of Dharmasastra, P.V. Kane cites a sloka found in another inscription and gives an informed exposition on the Hindu rituals performed there. This is the gist of the sloka: “In yajnas, vows, pilgrimages, the feeding of Brahmanas at sacred places, giving sacred offerings to ancestors, in the hands of a mendicant, wealth finds its righteousness.”

Such verses are abundantly found in thousands of inscriptions within India. But the fact that they were also discovered in Baku reaffirms the truth that Hindus create a new India wherever they go.

These verses also give us a hint as to why Hindus from India journeyed all the way to visit the Jvalaji Temple. It was believed to have a deep connection with the Jwalamukhi Temple in Kangra, a shakti peetha in Himachal Pradesh. Devotees regarded the Kangra deity as the chhota (smaller) Jvalaji and the one in Baku, as the bada (greater) Jvalaji. In A Second Journey through Persia, the British secretary to the embassy in Persia, James Morier, records his 1818 encounter with a sadhu in Karadagh, in East Azerbaijan: “… We met an Indian entirely alone, on foot, with no other weapon than a stick, who was on his road to Benares returning from his pilgrimage to Baku. He was walking with surprising alacrity, and saluted us with great good-humour, like one satisfied with himself for having done a good action. I believe that these religious feats are quite peculiar to the Indian character; or there is a great difference between the mind of one who undertakes a voyage to Mecca with a caravan, in the company of others, and of him who undismayed by solitude and distance, and unencouraged by example, perseveres in his object to the last.”

By the end of the 19th century, Arabia and Central Asia had become bloody theatres of war. As a result, most of the Hindu population in Baku fled. Its place was taken by Zoroastrians who mistook the Jvalaji Temple as a shrine of their venerated fire god and renamed it as Ateshgah. The term is a Persian compound word, a corruption of the Sanskrit words, atharvan (atesh: fire) and gruha (gah: house).

In 1925, the Zoroastrian priest Jivanji Jamshedji Modi travelled extensively in Iran, Azerbaijan and Russia and recorded his experiences in My Travels Outside Bombay: Iran, Azerbaijan, Baku. This is what he writes about the Jvalaji Temple: “… Any Parsee … after examining this [temple] with its inscriptions, architecture, etc., would conclude that this is not a Parsee Atash Kadeh but is a Hindu temple whose Brahmins … used to worship fire.”

When Jamshedji Modi visited Baku, it had long ceased to be a living temple or a Zoroastrian shrine. In 2007, the Azerbaijani president by decree designated the temple complex as a protected reserve named as the Ateshgah Temple State Historical Architectural Reserve. – Open Magazine, 23 October 2025

› Sandeep Balakrishna is an author, editor, columnist, public intellectual and an independent researcher. He is the founder and chief editor of The Dharm a Dispatch .

Manusmriti: Between prescription and practice – Prajesh Panikkar

March 31, 2026VOI

It is high time we examine an important question: why is the Manusmriti, a text so old and largely obsolete in everyday life, cast as the villain responsible for all our societal miseries today? Is this merely a matter of ignorance, or is there something more deliberate behind such attacks? Is it being used as a tool to portray an entire philosophical and religious tradition as primitive? – Prajesh Panikkar

There is an old joke about a philosophy professor who sets out to prove, with impeccable logic, that he is the best professor in the world. He leads a student step by step through a chain of unquestioned loyalties.

“Which is the best country in the world?” he asks. The student answers, of course, that it is their country. “And the best state in it?” The student replies that it is their state. “And the best town in that state?” It is their town. “The best college in that town?” It is their college. “And which is the best subject taught in that college?” the professor asks. “Philosophy”, the very subject the professor teaches, the student answers.

The final question is who teaches philosophy best in the college, and the answer is hardly a mystery: it is the same professor who has been asking the questions all along. The proof is now complete. By carefully choosing the premises and designing the questions, the professor arrives at the conclusion that he is the best professor in the world.

A similar mode of reasoning appears in the opening chapter of the Manusmriti, where Manu sets out to establish the pre-eminence of Brahmins who are Vedic savants. The text constructs a hierarchical sequence that moves from living beings to humans, from humans to Brahmins, and from Brahmins to the learned, the resolute, the active, and finally to those learned in the Vedas.

The logic mirrors that of the anecdote: once the hierarchy is accepted, the conclusion follows seamlessly. By defining value through a series of nested distinctions, the text arrives at its intended endpoint—the supremacy of the Vedic Brahmin—not as an assertion, but as the apparent outcome of an orderly classificatory process.

The text says: “Among creatures, living beings are the best; among living beings, those who subsist by intelligence; among those who subsist by intelligence, human beings; and among human beings, Brahmins—so the tradition declares. Among Brahmins, the learned are the best; among the learned, those who have made the resolve; among those who have made the resolve, the doers; and among doers, the Vedic savants.”

As mentioned in the previous part of this essay, the world as envisaged by the Manusmriti is Brahmin-centric, in which whatever exists on earth belongs to the Brahmin, and it is only by the kindness of the Brahmin that others are able to eat. From the very beginning of the text, from the first chapter itself, it is amply clear who the target audience is. The text is written for Brahmins.

In the same chapter, the Smriti further says: “[This text] should be studied diligently and taught to his pupils properly by a learned Brahmin, and by no one else. When a Brahmin who keeps to his vows studies this treatise, he is never sullied by faults arising from mental, oral, or physical activities; he purifies those alongside whom he eats, as also seven generations of his lineage before him and seven after him. […]” Echoing the Purusha Sukta of the Rig Veda, the Manusmriti also says that the Brahmin was produced from the mouth of the Purusha, and the Shudra from the feet.

There is absolutely nothing surprising in the fact that, in a text written two thousand years ago and aimed at a specific group of people, that group is described as pre-eminent among human beings. In Deuteronomy, the Lord tells the Jews that “God has chosen you to be a people for his treasured possession, out of all the peoples who are on the face of the earth,” and Jews, to this day, consider themselves the chosen people. Similar claims of “pre-eminence” can be found in the Quran with regard to Muslims as well.

A critique might say that Manusmriti is different. What makes Manusmriti, or the varna system as mentioned in the Smritis or the Rig Veda, different, he would argue, is the fact that these distinctions were more or less rigid. The varnas are assigned by birth, and one cannot choose one’s varna or convert from one to another. But this is, more or less, true of Abrahamic religions as well. Though one can convert to Judaism, converts were often socially (and at times communally) treated as distinct from born Jews in premodern Jewish societies, and frequently faced questions about whether they were “born Jews,” despite their formal religious status. Yet, there is a certain fluidity: a convert would be seen as fully Jewish after a couple of generations, the opponent might say. That is quite true of the varnas in Manu’s time as well. Though uncommon, complex, and practically onerous, the Smritis, including the Manusmriti, do prescribe such fluidity between varnas, a fact that those who care to study the text know well.

At considerable length, the text prescribes the life of a Brahmin and how it ought to be lived from the time of his birth. It specifies the childhood rites to be performed, the conduct required during his student life, the proper modes of respecting teachers, the manner of marriage, his duties as a husband, the prescribed forms of prayer, the propitiation of ancestors, the management of household affairs, and the conduct expected in old age. After a life lived in strict accordance with the Smṛtis, a Brahmin is expected to become a forest hermit once his hair has turned grey and he has seen his grandchildren. The text also tries to regulate the governance of the state, setting out the duties and daily routine of the king, the judicial system, and the various forms of punishment prescribed for the four varnas.

There are many well-known aspects of the Manusmriti that one may have heard about: particularly its treatment of castes lower than Brahmins with contempt, and its infamous assertion that women do not deserve independence. There are also passages that many may not have encountered: sections that are known only to those who take the trouble to read the text itself. These passages, too, are interesting, though for different reasons. Consider, for example, the rules concerning eating.

According to the Manusmṛti, a Brahmin is not supposed to eat anything that has been offered to the deities. He is also not supposed to consume anything that has turned sour, except curd. When it comes to vegetarianism, the text explicitly states that there is nothing inherently wrong with consuming meat. “Prajapati created this whole world as food for lifebreath; all beings, the mobile and the immobile, are nourishment for lifebreath. … The eater is not defiled by eating living beings suitable for eating, even if he eats them day after day; for the creator himself fashioned both the eaters and the living beings suitable for eating,” says the Manusmriti. In a similar manner, the text also states that there is no fault in drinking liquor or in engaging in sexual activity. It is worth noting, once again, that this is a text whose intended audience is Brahmins, and one that is regarded as the most authoritative within its tradition.

None of these prescriptions are followed by Brahmins today, and there is little evidence to suggest that they were strictly followed even in the time of Manu. Vegetarianism was not prescribed by Manu. It did not become a dominant Brahmanical ideal in the Manusmriti itself, but only afterward, when debates over meat-eating versus non-violence intensified in later texts. Scholars such as Ludwig Alsdorf, who studied the growth of vegetarianism in India, maintain that Brahmin vegetarianism is a post-Vedic development that emerged after the Manusmriti.

In South India, a staple food in most Brahmin households is idli, which is made from a fermented and sour batter. K.T. Achaya, the renowned food historian, notes that idli is mentioned in a thousand-year-old Kannada text, where it is prescribed as one of the dishes to be offered to a Brahmachari. This also suggests that, although the Manusmriti were revered and respected, everyday life among Brahmins was not rigidly dictated by its norms. Life was always lived pragmatically, and there is no indication that anyone lived strictly in accordance with the prescriptions of the Smritis. Even if people had sought to do so, it would often have been impractical, and wherever practical considerations prevailed, the Smritis yielded.

The Smritis conceived of a world in which Brahmins were universally respected and in which everything under the heavens belonged to them. The real world, however, was the opposite of this ideal. By the time the Manusmriti was composed, society consisted of multiple religious groups, some of them more powerful than the Brahmins. The authority and prestige that Brahmins had once enjoyed were in decline. It therefore became important to codify and imagine a world in which Brahmins were supreme.

The real world diverged significantly from this idealized vision. Sometimes these divergences were excused; at other times, they were attributed to regional customs, which were often said to be contrary to the Smritis. Moreover, different Smritis expressed differing opinions on the same matters. There was no single text that dictated customs, rituals, or ways of life that was accepted by everyone—or even by all Brahmins. The absence of universally accepted norms in these areas was a well-known reality. One of the oft-quoted shlokas from the Mahabharata expresses this clearly. The shloka says: arguments are inconclusive, the Vedas have divergent emphases, and different rishis hold different views; the essence of dharma is hidden, and therefore one must follow the path of great men.

That is the point: there is no universally acceptable way, no universally authoritative text, and no universally accepted teacher. Indians, from the time of the Manusmriti, were acutely aware of this reality. At times, divergences from the Smritis could be so pronounced that practices perceived as violating the moral norms of the society of the time were explained as consequences of the Kaliyuga. Tantric traditions sometimes adopt this approach. Some Tantric texts claim that the Vedas are no longer effective in the Kaliyuga, or that a new value system independent of Vedic authority is required in this age—a role that Tantra itself is said to fulfil.

A text written two thousand years ago, reflecting values that are even older, is bound to raise concerns when compared with contemporary values. That much is obvious. Surprisingly, however, Manusmriti also contains several elements that align well with modern values. Just last week, in support of a judgment in an inheritance case, the Supreme Court of India cited the Manusmriti to convey the idea that no one in the immediate family, including the mother, father, wife, or son, should be abandoned, thereby reinforcing the principle of familial support.

A text that is notorious for its views on castes lower than Brahmins, however, does not explicitly deny access to Vedic knowledge for non-Brahmins. In fact, the text intriguingly states that in times of adversity, a man may study the Veda under a teacher who is not a Brahmin, thereby acknowledging that Vedic knowledge was familiar among non-Brahmins as well. The text does not explicitly permit inter-caste marriage, but it again, curiously, notes that one may marry a splendid woman even if she comes from a “bad” family. For all its normative severity, these are some of the rare instances where the text sheds light on social realities that appear to have existed at the time of its composition.

Considering all this, it is high time we examine an important question: why is a text so old and largely obsolete in everyday life cast as the villain responsible for all our societal miseries today? Is this merely a matter of ignorance, or is there something more deliberate behind such attacks? Is it being used as a tool to portray an entire philosophical and religious tradition as primitive?

For instance, Audrey Truschke, in her recent book on Indian history, examines what she describes as Manu’s “dismal view of women,” before quoting the well-known verse in the Manusmriti that denies independence to women. Similarly, in examining a punishment dictated for an “unfaithful wife” in the Yajnavalkya Smriti, Truschke notes that the penalty may appear even darker to modern eyes once one realises that Yajnavalkya does not specify whether the woman’s unfaithfulness was by choice or by force. Judged by contemporary standards, these positions may indeed appear dismal. The question, however, is why such ancient texts should be evaluated by contemporary standards at all. Where is the historical empathy or contextualism that a historian is expected to maintain?

No one adopts a similarly judgmental tone when writing about Greek or Assyrian history. One might respond that, unlike in India, the religions of ancient Greece or Assyria are long extinct, and that no surviving texts from those traditions continue to exert normative influence. Yet this objection does not hold entirely. There exist legal and religious texts—indeed, law codes—that remain relevant within the Abrahamic traditions. Historians do not approach these texts by measuring them against modern human-rights standards or by dwelling on their moral dismalness. Nor do they routinely frame them as evidence of the inherent primitiveness of an entire religious worldview.

In the end, the Manusmriti appears less as a sinister blueprint for social oppression than as a historically situated attempt to imagine order, authority, and moral hierarchy in a world that was already far more plural, fluid, and unruly than the text itself would admit. Its prescriptions reflect aspiration as much as reality, ideology as much as practice, and anxiety as much as power. To read it as a timeless moral code, whether to defend it uncritically or to condemn it as the source of all social ills, is to misunderstand both the nature of the text and the culture that produced it.

A historically responsible reading requires neither reverence nor outrage, but contextual understanding—an awareness that traditions are internally diverse, contested, and constantly renegotiated. When ancient texts are singled out for moral prosecution while comparable materials elsewhere are treated with interpretive caution, the problem lies not in the past but in the present lenses through which that past is viewed. Such selective moralism transforms historical inquiry into a form of contemporary adjudication, where texts are judged less for what they meant in their own time than for how effectively they can be mobilised to support present-day narratives. In doing so, history ceases to be an effort to understand difference and becomes instead a search for culprits, with ancient texts made to bear burdens they were never meant to carry.

The Manusmriti, like any other ancient legal or ethical text, tells us far more about the anxieties, negotiations, and self-fashioning of its times than about immutable truths or enduring social mandates; to treat it otherwise is to replace history with polemic. – News18, 22 january 2026

› Prajesh Panikkar is a commentator with a research degree in philosophy from the University of Sheffield, focusing on the intersections of culture, history, and politics.

Marxism vs Buddhism: The next battlefield in Tibet – Claude Arpi

March 27, 2026March 27, 2026VOI

China is batting for a Chinese Dalai Lama, something that the current Dalai Lama has ruled out. – Claude Arpi

Strategic analysts have a hard time for the past few years; most of their views and predictions have gone wrong due to the turmoil which has been occurring all around the world. It is particularly true since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, which was supposed to last only for a few days.

New war tactics and weaponry, for example the use of drones, have appeared in a big way. If it does not want to lose coming battles, India does not have much choice, it needs to take a relook at the battlefields. In these circumstances, information warfare takes an increasingly predominant place.

China has always been far ahead of the rest of the world in the field of propaganda and information warfare, which has sustained the totalitarian regime for decades.

Today, however, one of China’s favourite themes is Buddhism.

Beijing would like the world to believe that Buddhism has for centuries been an important component of Chinese civilisation and that China should take the lead in the propagation of the teachings of the Great Monk, who more than 2,500 years ago wandered in the plains of North India, preaching compassion, mindfulness and interdependent arising.

Paradoxically, Beijing wants to teach Buddhism to Tibet. In September 2025, a meeting was convened in Lhasa by Wang Junzheng, the secretary of the party committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), to address Communist officials dealing with “religion”.

Is it not surprising that a state which follows Karl Marx’s atheist precepts should deal with religion?

Wang insisted on the necessity “to earnestly study and implement General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important instructions on religious work and … systematically promote the Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism”. The objective was to “lay a solid foundation for long-term peace and stability”. This means that to be stable, Tibet needs to be Buddhist, but with Chinese characteristics.

Wang mentioned Xi Jinping’s visit to Tibet in July 2025, during which the president gave “important instructions … to emphasise Buddhism with the requirements to systematically promote the Sinicization of China’s religion, strengthen the governance of religious affairs and the rule of law and guide Tibetan Buddhism to adapt to the socialist society”.

In other words, first Marx and then the Buddha.

On November 11, Wang Junzheng, again presiding over a symposium on religious legislation in Tibet, asked the participants to “solidly promote the construction of the Chinese national community, actively guide Tibetan Buddhism to adapt to the socialist society”.

On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of his enthronement, Gyaltsen Norbu, called the “fake” Panchen Lama by Tibetans, mentioned the succession of the 14th Dalai Lama. Norbu said: “The reincarnation of the living Buddha is an internal affair of our country. Historically, the reincarnation of living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism in China has always adhered to the principles and traditions of domestic search, and there has never been a precedent for visiting abroad”.

He added: “China’s living Buddha reincarnation system belongs to Chinese monasteries, and its reincarnation management is an integral part of China’s religious affairs management.”

China is batting for a Chinese Dalai Lama, something that the latter has ruled out.

In December 2025, India took the initiative of organising a four-day international conference on the “Cultural and Historical Significance of His Holiness the Sixth Dalai Lama, Gyalwa Tsangyang Gyatso” in Tawang.

The sixth Dalai Lama was born in the 17th century in Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh.

In a post on X about the event on the Sixth Dalai Lama, Arunachal Pradesh chief minister Pema Khandu wrote: “Tawang [has] today become the centre of a global academic dialogue on his cultural, historical and spiritual legacy. He continues to inspire humanity through his timeless teachings, poetry and compassion.”

In another post, he remarked: “The world remembers his poetry, but not the fullness of his teachings and wisdom. It is time that changes.”

Beijing was not amused. It believes that Buddhism belongs to China—and that Tawang too is Chinese!

Pasang Norbu, honorary president of the Tsangyang Gyatso Cultural Research Association in Tibet, issued a statement about what he called the so-called “international conference”; he said that “it represents a blatant provocation to China’s territorial sovereignty and the established norms of international relations … Such actions seriously undermine the efforts of both China and India to resolve territorial disputes and enhance bilateral relations. Ultimately, this is a political farce with ulterior motives.”

Today, China seems to believe that it is the only “owner” of Buddhism.

In this connection, it was a positive move that the second Global Buddhist Summit was convened by the International Buddhist Confederation (IBC), in collaboration with the Union ministry of culture. It took place on January 24 and 25 at the Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi. It was a new occasion to reaffirm that Buddha is a Son of India.

The two-day conference brought together more than 200 delegates and around 800 participants from India and abroad, mostly Buddhist leaders, scholars, practitioners and policymakers, to discuss contemporary global challenges viewed through the message of the Buddha. The theme of the summit was “Collective Wisdom, United Voice, and Mutual Coexistence”.

The main objective was to convey that India stands for world peace in the troubled times that the planet is going through and planetary issues must be faced in the spirit of collaboration, respect for others and mindfulness.

It would be good for China to remember history.

During the 7th century AD, after marrying Princesses Bikruti of Nepal and Wencheng of China, King Songtsen Gampo had converted to Buddhism. A hundred years later, King Trisong Detsen requested Shantarakshita, the abbot of Nalanda University, to teach the Buddha Dharma and ordain the first monks. Shantarakshita immediately faced serious difficulties due to the strong opposition from the indigenous faithful. He convinced the king to invite the tantric guru Padmasambhava, who alone could subdue the forces adverse to Buddhism. The Indian Master succeeded in his endeavour and built the first monastery in Samye, south of Lhasa.

Later, Shantarakshita predicted that a dispute would arise between the Indian and Chinese schools of Buddhism. The dispute was sorted out through the famous Samye Debate. After two years of intense discussions (792-794 CE), the Indian path prevailed and a proclamation was issued stating that the Indian path was thereafter the state religion. Since then, the Nalanda tradition of Indian Buddhism has been the state religion of Tibet.

India must be prepared to tackle the propaganda onslaught from China; it will be tomorrow’s battlefield. – Deccan Chronicle, 18 March 2026

› Claude Arpi is Distinguished Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence (Delhi), and writes on India, China, Tibet and Indo-French relations.

Statement Affirming the Continuation of the Institution of Dalai Lama – Office of the Dalai Lama – Dharamsala – July 2, 2025

On 24 September 2011, at a meeting of the heads of Tibetan spiritual traditions, I made a statement to fellow Tibetans in and outside Tibet, followers of Tibetan Buddhism, and those who have a connection with Tibet and Tibetans, regarding whether the institution of the Dalai Lama should continue. I stated, “As far back as 1969, I made clear that concerned people should decide whether the Dalai Lama’s reincarnations should continue in the future.”

I also said, “When I am about ninety I will consult the high Lamas of the Tibetan Buddhist traditions, the Tibetan public, and other concerned people who follow Tibetan Buddhism, to re-evaluate whether or not the institution of the Dalai Lama should continue.”

Although I have had no public discussions on this issue, over the last 14 years leaders of Tibet’s spiritual traditions, members of the Tibetan Parliament in Exile, participants in a Special General Body Meeting, members of the Central Tibetan Administration, NGOs, Buddhists from the Himalayan region, Mongolia, Buddhist republics of the Russian Federation and Buddhists in Asia including mainland China, have written to me with reasons, earnestly requesting that the institution of the Dalai Lama continue. In particular, I have received messages through various channels from Tibetans in Tibet making the same appeal. In accordance with all these requests, I am affirming that the institution of the Dalai Lama will continue.

The process by which a future Dalai Lama is to be recognized has been clearly established in the 24 September 2011 statement which states that responsibility for doing so will rest exclusively with members of the Gaden Phodrang Trust, the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. They should consult the various heads of the Tibetan Buddhist traditions and the reliable oath-bound Dharma Protectors who are linked inseparably to the lineage of the Dalai Lamas. They should accordingly carry out the procedures of search and recognition in accordance with past tradition.

I hereby reiterate that the Gaden Phodrang Trust has sole authority to recognize the future reincarnation; no one else has any such authority to interfere in this matter.

Dalai Lama

Dharamshala
21 May 2025

(Translated from the original Tibetan)

West’s 100-year-old dream of a Christian nation in South Asia – Sumit Ahlawat

March 22, 2026March 24, 2026VOI

The theory that Western countries, primarily the US, are actively abetting armed insurgency to establish a Christian state in India’s northeastern region, similar to East Timor, that could also serve as a Western military base in the Bay of Bengal, has gained credence with the arrest of foreign mercinaries in India – Sumit Ahlawat

The arrest of seven foreigners, including six Ukrainians and one known US mercenary, Matthew VanDyke, in India for illegally trying to cross into Myanmar, supply weapons and provide drone training to armed rebel groups, has once again fanned the theory of a long-term Western conspiracy to carve out a Christian majority state from contiguous parts of northeastern India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar.

VanDyke is an internationally renowned, notorious figure who first gained attention during the Libyan Civil War in 2011, when he joined rebel fighters on the ground and was imprisoned.

Subsequently, VanDyke founded an organisation called Sons of Liberty International (SOLI), which provides military training to local armed groups in conflict zones worldwide. Reportedly, he has also participated in the Syrian Civil War and the Russia-Ukraine War.

According to India’s premier counterterrorism agency, the NIA, as many as 14 Ukrainian nationals entered India on tourist visas on different dates. They flew to Guwahati and then travelled to Mizoram without the required documents.

While the theory that Western countries, primarily the US, are actively abetting armed insurgency to establish a Christian state in this region, similar to East Timor, that could also serve as a Western military base in the Bay of Bengal, was often dismissed as speculative and sensational, the arrest of these foreigners is a smoking gun and lends credence to these allegations.

The theory was first suggested by none other than former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in 2024, was alluded to by the chief minister of the Indian state of Mizoram in 2025, and, with the arrest of these foreigners, can no longer be dismissed as a conspiracy theory.

Interestingly, the idea of a Christian-majority, ethno-nationalist state in the region, backed by Western powers, providing a military base to the US in the Bay of Bengal, and actively serving as a frontline state against Chinese interests in the region, is not as bizarre as it seems to be.

The idea is supported by the peculiar religious demography of the region, the long-standing connection of these communities to the Baptist Church in the US, pre-existing ethnic/tribal clevages, real or imagined grievances of injustice, and has a very long pedigree.

In fact, the idea goes back nearly a century and was initially floated by the UK during the dying days of British imperialism.

In the 1940s, when India was about to gain independence, there was an attempt to carve out a separate crown colony from the tribal hill districts of Northeast India and parts of Western Burma, directly under the control of the British crown.

That crown colony would have provided the UK a foothold in South Asia and the Bay of Bengal even after the end of their British Indian Empire, the so-called Jewel in the Crown.

Christian Country Carved Out Of India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar?

In 2024, months before her tragic fall as the prime minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina had claimed that “conspiracies” were being hatched to topple her government and that she may be assassinated just like her father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

She further alleged that a Western power is conspiring to establish a “Christian country” out of Bangladesh and Myanmar, similar to East Timor.

She alleged that a “white man” offered her easy re-election in 2024 if she agreed to allow a foreign country to build an airbase in Bangladesh.

“If I allowed a certain country to build an airbase in Bangladesh, then I would have had no problem,” she said. The offer came from a “white man”, she said. “It may appear it is aimed at only one country, but it is not. I know where else they intend to go.”

“There will be more trouble,” she had warned.

“Like East Timor … they will carve out a Christian country, taking parts of Bangladesh (Chattogram) and Myanmar with a base in the Bay of Bengal.”

A few months after these comments, Hasina’s government was toppled in Bangladesh, and she had to flee the country.

In March 2025, Mizoram chief minister Lalduhoma warned that foreign nationals, including those from the US and UK, were using the state as a transit route to enter Myanmar. These foreigners were suspected of training insurgent groups in Myanmar.

These foreigners were suspected of providing training in drone warfare and supplying sophisticated weapons to these rebels, including drones.

Notably, insurgents in both India’s northeast and in the Chin state of Myanmar have used drones in their armed struggle against security forces.

In September 2024, for the first time, armed rebels in Manipur used drones to drop bombs on security forces. This was the first time ever that drones were used in India by an insurgent group.

Similarly, armed rebels in the Chin state of Myanmar have regularly used armed drones to hit Myanmar security forces.

The Religious Demography of ‘Zo Land’

A Christian-majority country, caved out of Hindu-majority India, Muslim-majority Bangladesh, and Buddhist-majority Myanmar might seem bizarre; however, the peculiar religious demography of this region could support this idea.

The so-called Christian majority, ethno-nationalist country has also been called “Zo land” (or Zogam/Zoram), which refers to the ancestral homeland of the Zo people, a Kuki-Chin-Mizo ethnic group inhabiting parts of India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh.

The Kuki tribes of Manipur, the Mizo tribes of Mizoram, the Chin people of Myanmar, and the tribal people in Bandarban district and adjoining areas of Bangladesh’s Chittagong division have recently collectively started calling themselves the Zo people.

All of these tribes are also Christian-majority.

For instance, Manipur has approximately 41.3% Christian population. However, the state’s population is divided along ethnic and religious lines.

Manipur has two large groups: Meiteis and Kukis.

The Meiteis, who mostly live in the Manipur plains, are overwhelmingly Hindu.

The Kukis, living in the hilly areas of Manipur, are overwhelmingly Christian (up to 98%).

Similarly, in the Mizoram state of India, the Christian population is 87 percent.

In the Chin state of Myanmar, the Christian population is over 85 percent.

The Bandarban district of Bangladesh also has a significant Christian minority.

These people, the Kuki-Chin-Mizo or the Zo people, are, therefore, connected by religious and ethnic ties.

They also live in a geographically contiguous region comprising India’s Manipur and Mizoram states, Myanmar’s Chin state, and Bangladesh’s Chittagong division.

However, their ancestral lands have been divided into three different countries.

Ironically, the same colonial state that is responsible for Christianizing them was also responsible for dividing their ancestral lands into three different countries.

Christianity in India’s North East

In the 19th century, most of these people followed various tribal and animistic religions.

Nagaland and Mizoram came under British control in the 19th century following the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826) and the Treaty of Yandabo.

The British annexed Assam and, by 1880, brought the Naga Hills under control through military expeditions. Similarly, Mizoram (Lushai Hills) was controlled by 1890-1895 through punitive expeditions.

The British encouraged Christian missionary work in these tribal areas. At the same time, the British imposed an inner-line permit regime for these areas, which helped shape a separate identity for these groups, distinct from the rest of India.

Most of the conversion took place in the 20th century, between 1931 and 1951.

In the 1940s, when it became apparent that India would gain independence, a few colonial administrators floated the idea of a Christian-majority crown colony in India’s northeast, to be administered directly from London.

The plan would have ensured a British base in South Asia even after India’s independence.

The plan was known as The Coupland Plan.

Named after its architect, Sir Reginald Coupland, this plan proposed creating a separate administrative unit comprising the tribal, Christian-majority areas of Assam and the tribal regions of Burma (present-day Myanmar). The core idea was to keep these territories under direct British control even after India gained independence in 1947.

The idea was initially kept secret, but soon it gained popularity and a degree of acceptance, both among the tribals as well as in the British bureaucracy. The way maps were being redrawn around the world meant anything was possible.

Singapore, Bermuda, Aden, and Gibraltar were already British crown colonies, and so was Hong Kong.

However, multiple factors, including fierce opposition from the Indian National Congress, the economic dependence of these regions on the Indian plains, and opposition by many tribal leaders themselves, ensured that the plan was quietly abandoned by 1946.

Still, the British divided these regions into three separate countries. Chhitangong was a Buddhist-majority region, and thus, according to the logic of Indian partition, it should have become part of India. Yet, Britishers made it part of Muslim-majority Pakistan.

In 1971, after Bangladesh’s independence, it became part of Bangladesh.

Burma was officially separated from India in 1937, separating indigenous communities like the Nagas, Kukis, and Mizos.

Following India’s independence in 1947 and Burma’s in 1948, the border became an international frontier.

So, the British colonial state, which encouraged the conversion of these tribal communities to Christianity, thereby helping to emerge pan-ethno-religious identities, and formulated the idea of a separate crown colony, was also responsible for dividing these communities into three countries.

Now, nearly eight decades later, the idea of a separate Christian-majority country in India’s northeast is again fanned by Western countries, primarily the US, hoping to gain a military base in the Bay of Bengal, and a frontier to destabilise South Asia and check China’s expansion.

The plan was earlier alluded to by Sheikh Hasina and the Mizoram chief minister; now, the arrest of these individuals is further proof that this is not just some conspiracy theory, but foreign intelligence agencies and transnational mercenary groups are already working on such a plan. – EurAsian Times, 19 March 2026

› Sumit Ahlawat is a Senior Editor at The EurAsian Times.

The Issue of Conversion: Challenges before Hindu Society – Maria Wirth

March 19, 2026March 24, 2026VOI 1 Comment

Is it possible that the government does not want to know what is happening on the religious front? … When there is no will to know what is happening regarding conversions, there is probably also no will to stop it. The government, rightfully, maintains that it is secular and not concerned about the religion of its subjects. – Maria Wirth

Abstract

This article examines the aggressive proselytization targeting Hindus in India, exposing the socio-political and cultural ramifications of conversions to Abrahamic religions. It highlights the lack of reliable data on conversions, despite documented cases of fraudulent tactics, including financial incentives, “miracle cures,” and exploitation of vulnerable communities. The author contrasts Hinduism—an inclusive, philosophy-based tradition emphasizing dharma (righteousness) and universal spiritual truth—with the exclusive, dogmatic nature of Christianity and Islam, which claim sole religious legitimacy and threaten non-believers with eternal damnation. The article wonders why the secular Indian government is enabling religious inequalities, such as preferential treatment for “minority” religions and the marginalization of Hindu institutions. It is argued that conversions fracture social harmony, empower divisive forces, and erode India’s spiritual heritage. She calls for educating Hindus about their profound philosophical roots (e.g., Advaita Vedanta), challenging irrational dogmas of Christianity and Islam through rational discourse, and stopping unequal religious policies by the state. Ultimately, Wirth frames the preservation of Hinduism as essential not only for India’s cultural integrity but also for humanity as a whole. The Vedic knowledge that God is within as blissful consciousness (sat-chit-ananda) is lacking in the Abrahamic religions.

Text

Conversion is a big challenge for Hindu society in India. Yet it is hardly a topic of public debate. Moreover, it is impossible to get accurate data of conversions. In fact, even the data regarding the composition of the population religion wise, may not be reliable.

In 1947, India’s population was around 36.1 crores, of whom 30.37 crores (84.1%) were Hindus, 3.54 crore (9.8%) were Muslims, 0.83 crore (2.3%) were Christians and 0.27 crores (0.7%) Buddhists (the figures are based on the census of 1951).
In the 2011 census, the Hindu population had shrunk by 4.3 percent and the Muslim population had grown by 4.4 percent. The overall population had tripled to 121.9 crores. Hindus accounted for 96.62 crore (79.8%), Muslims for 17.22 crore (14.23%), Christians for 2.78 crores (2.3%) and Buddhists for 0.84 crore (0.7%).

The census of 2021 was postponed due to the Covid pandemic and will be held only in 2026/27. It can be assumed that since 2011, the Hindu population has shrunk further, yet the population of Muslims is still cited to be 14 percent and that of Christians still 2 percent. Do we bury our heads ostrich-like in the sand?

According to the website censusofindia.net, in 2025, the overall population is estimated at 141 crores, of whom 114 crores are expected to be Hindus. This would be a slight increase of Hindus to 80 percent, which is unlikely considering the massive conversion attempts, apart from the lower Hindu birthrate. Unfortunately, I could not find official numbers for conversions. ChatGPT says: “I could not find any official government estimate that gives a precise number of Hindus who have converted to Christianity since 2011. In fact, the Government of India has explicitly said that no central record/database of religious conversion is maintained.”

The same is valid for Islam: “There is no reliable official data specifying how many Hindus have converted to Islam in India since 2011.” ChatGPT continued, “Most demographic surveys, including those by Pew Research Center, find that religious switching is very rare overall.” According to Pew research survey of 2021, 0.7 percent of the respondents said that they have changed their religion. This would come to around 6 million people. Yet since there is no central database of religious conversion, the true numbers are anybody’s guess.

Aggressive conversions are happening

Most of us know even from personal observation, that missionary activity is extremely high in India by both Christianity and Islam, especially in certain states like Punjab or Tamil Nadu, and basically everywhere, specifically in tribal areas. They don’t hide it. Christian publications exhort their members to convert Hindus. “India must be evangelised in this generation”, declared Blessings, a Christian youth magazine in its 2008 issue, which a priest from Tamil Nadu had left with me. And a German Catholic magazine, which landed in my mother’s mailbox, had an article with the ominous title, “India – a success story”.

The Joshua Project is clearly implemented. New churches shoot up, Christian schools offer discount for fees for Christians, missionaries ‘visit’ patients in hospitals, etc. Occasionally, news about conversions come out in the media due to complaints by Hindus. Some examples from only one week:

On 30. September 2025, several news outlets reported that over 1000 Hindus from poor and backward castes converted to Christianity in Lucknow’s Mohanlalganj. A village once free of Christianity had now 5 churches and100 plus prayer halls. According to India Today, police unearthed a well-oiled nexus to lure Dalits with the help of ‘miracles cures’.

A few days later, another huge conversion ring with wide connections across states was uncovered in Gujarat’s Nandiad, on which OpInda reported.

Soon after, on 6. October, more concerning news surfaced. An American, James Watson, in India on a business visa, was arrested together with two Indian associates for fraudulent conversions in villages in Maharashtra, targeting especially children. He told them that “Hinduism is based on superstition. But if they convert, they will be happy, prosperous and cured from illness.” In this connection, CNN News 18 reported that between 2018 and 2025 over 320 cases had been discovered of visa misuse for religious conversion. This may be only the tip of the iceberg.

Muslims, too, try hard to get Hindus into their fold

The Chhangur Baba case shows how much money flows into fraudulent, elaborate conversion efforts. He and his associates were arrested in July 2025. He received hundreds of crores from abroad for his conversion racket, where he funded Muslim men to entrap Hindu girls. Love Jihad, for long denied, can’t be denied any longer. Even otherwise, Muslims are taught to coax Hindus into converting by presenting Islam as far more attractive than Hinduism. Zakir Naik said in one of his speeches around 2016, it is easy for Muslims to convert Hindus. They only need to show Hindus a picture of Ganesha, with his elephant head and big belly, and ask them whether this is the God whom they worship.

This situation is concerning and the question, why the government has no database, is only natural. Even in states, which have enacted anti-conversion laws, and where it is obligatory to register a change of religion, no overall numbers are available. What is available, are FIRs filed for unlawful conversion, and individual notifications in government Gazettes about name changes. But how many conversions in toto happened, nobody seems knows.

Religion is not a concern for the government

Is it possible that the government does not want to know what is happening on the religious front? If this is true, then even the 2011 census may not give the correct picture. And from an anecdotical episode, this is indeed possible.

A teacher in Mumbai, who was part of the 2011 census team, told me that during the training for the census, they were instructed to accept whatever information they were given. She surveyed a heavily Muslim populated area and knew that she was not getting honest answers. She went back to her supervisor and told him, that the census won’t be accurate if they are not allowed to check the information, for example how many children a family has. Her instructor was blunt, “You heard the instruction. Accept whatever info is given.” She told me, “If the government manages to conduct an accurate census next time, it will be a shock for Hindus.”

When there is no will to know what is happening regarding conversions, there is probably also no will, to stop it. The government, rightfully, maintains that it is secular and not concerned about the religion of its subjects. It has a point. This is clearly a worldwide attitude. The German government also no longer records the religion of its citizens. It did so till in the 1950s, when I was in primary school and dutifully filled out “RK” for Roman Catholic in all official forms. Yet, today, only the Churches keep a record.

Hinduism and the Abrahamic religions are completely different categories

The situation in India is, however, unique. The Hindu faith of the majority is very different from Islam and Christianity. Often it is not even considered as a religion, because it does not have a rigid belief system, but it is rather a way of life. It has a solid foundation in philosophy and demands to follow dharma—to do the right thing in the given situation according to one’s conscience. It does not exclude anyone from being ‘allowed’ into the Presence of God. In fact, it claims, God is already present in everyone, and explains what is meant by ‘God” (not a kind of biased superman on a golden throne high up in the sky, but all-pervading, pure, blissful consciousness). In short, Hinduism makes a lot of sense.

Unlike Islam and Christianity, which were brought to India by invaders, Hinduism does not proselytise. Those two foreign religions demand blind belief in dogmas. A dogma is a claim that cannot be proven to be true, and the most irrational, and very harmful dogmas of both Islam and Christianity are the claims that, 1. Only their religion is true (both didn’t sort out over the centuries, which one exactly is true, because of course they don’t have any proof for their claims) and 2. if you don’t convert to Islam or Christianity, the great God will discard you at Judgement Day and let you burn eternally hell.

Burden of history

Hindus were threatened and brutally coerced to convert first by Muslim and later by Christian invaders over several centuries. Millions of Hindus died for their faith. Many preferred humiliation and financial burden to conversion. When the outsiders left, Hinduism was still strong. However, most of those Hindus, who had converted to Islam and Christianity during foreign occupation, were successfully alienated from their original tradition especially during British rule, who were, and still are, masters in ‘divide and rule’. They made those converts believe that they were better, higher, more worthy than Hindus.

At Independence in 1947, Muslims demanded their own country to be carved out from India, called Pakistan, which in 1971 split into Pakistan and Bangladesh. So, one would expect that Islam is no longer a problem in India, and Hindus have only to deal with those who converted to Christianity but who also, like Muslims, believe that they alone have the true religion, and Hindus will be eternally damned by God if they don’t convert. Yet this is a wrong notion because many Muslims, who agitated for a separate state before Independence on the ground that they can’t live with Hindus, did not go to Pakistan. They stayed back, possibly even with the nefarious agenda to fulfil Allah’s alleged wish to make all Indians follow Islam. The truncated India was generous and allowed it, maybe on the advice of the British who wanted to sow the seeds for division in Independent India.

Many Hindus probably considered the Indian Muslims and Christians as not very different from themselves, and did not realise that their religious doctrine had meanwhile indoctrinated many of them to look down on Hindus, and they had become as unreasonable as their foreign masters used to be. Now the converts, too, believed that the Great God Allah does not like Hindus and will throw them into eternal hellfire, and that Allah/God wants only Muslims/Christians on earth. No reasonable person would believe this, and Indians are generally reasonable, but due to indoctrination from childhood, many of the converts had embraced this irrational belief.

Respectable Gods and religions

Moreover, on the international stage, those religions, which consider the creator of this vast universe as personal, vengeful and biased, are considered respectable even today. People, who are otherwise reasonable, don’t realise that a God, who loves only certain people, must be a tribal God and cannot be the Source of All.

Unfortunately, Hindus did not seem to be aware of those dogmas. Otherwise, why would they allow Christian schools to continue after Independence to teach Hindu children, when ‘good’ Christian teachers naturally look down on their Hindu students because, according to the Church, they follow a dark, demonic cult?

Why would the government allow the catechism to be taught to Christian students, but not allow Vedanta philosophy, which is a rational explanation of what is true, to be taught—not even to Hindu students?

Why would the ‘minority religions’, parts of which are irrational and based entirely on blind belief, get government concessions, and Hindu Dharma, which is based on solid philosophy, would be disadvantaged, for example in the Right to Education Act or regarding their places of worship?

Indian Secularism is upside down

So, even though a secular state is not supposed to be interested in the religion of its subjects, in India, certain reforms would only be fair, as presently the stakes are stacked against Hindus. If a Hindu converts, he gets the advantage of belonging to a politically influential ‘minority’, which is worldwide even a majority. And if he happens to be a criminal, even world media will treat him more leniently than it treats Hindus, and it seems, as if this lenient treatment extends even to the judiciary worldwide.

Agreed, the government has no role to play in religion, but it surely has to level the playing field, especially since the Abrahamic religions and Hindu Dharma are in very different categories: Islam and Christianity are exclusive and divide society between those who are right and saved, and those who are wrong and damned. Even in the interest of developing a ‘rational mindset’, which is the explicit goal of education, the followers of those religions should not be given favours by the government.
In contrast, Hindu Dharma is inclusive and makes sense. It claims that ultimately all will reach back to their divine Source and it exhorts to follow Dharma. It would make sense, in the interest of a stable society, to favour it.

A harmonious society is rather impossible if the divisiveness of the dogmatic religions is not taken out

If you have many crores of Indians who despise Hindus because according to their belief, Hindus are great sinners by worshipping false Gods, a harmonious society is tough to achieve, and enemies of Bharat have a field day to instigate chaos and violence. This is not theory. It’s happening, including with big money from the Deep State, as the investigation into USAID had revealed.

Do Hindus even know what is preached in the innumerable churches and mosques across India? I know that Hindu Gods are called devils or demons by Christian clergy. Yet incredibly, Hindus don’t challenge those harmful dogmas of Christianity and Islam, even though they easily could, as they have the better arguments. Not only this: according to the Human Rights Charter of the United Nations, it is unacceptable to demean a group of people as inferior and damned for eternity. Yet strangely, when a religious doctrine demeans a billion people, moreover people, who are known to be open-minded and dharmic, nobody flags it as wrong.

It shows that the powers-that-be prefer that humans everywhere hold irrational beliefs instead of gaining deep insights into what is true and what can be experienced. It means, Hinduism is an obstacle for those powers. This is an important point and, in all likelihood, responsible for the unfair negative portrayal of Hinduism in world media and the entertainment industry and for funnelling money into conversion attempts. Yet the eradication of Hinduism is definitely not in the interest of humanity as a whole.

Blunders that need to be corrected

It was clearly a blunder that Hindus did not explain their faith to the Indian followers of the Abrahamic religions right after Independence and it needs to be corrected urgently. And an even greater blunder also needs to be corrected: Hindu pundits hardly explained the solid philosophical foundation of their faith even to their own people and especially to the younger generations.

Hindus are strongly focussed on education. Parents make great sacrifices to educate their children well. Yet they did not realise that under the garb of modern education their offspring was not learning anything about their ancient tradition but instead, their children were weaned away from it—due to the immense influence of the Left, which is an arm of the infamous Deep State.

Young Hindus, who went through college education, no longer know the basics of their faith and have not even heard of the Brahman (Advaita Vedanta) that is their own inner essence. Many become atheists, without knowing what being an atheist actually means. In recent years, they become not only atheists, but also ‘woke’ and ‘sexually liberated’, whatever this means. This virus affects mainly the Hindu youth. Of course, not all Hindu youth, but many have no longer an anchor in their faith—a faith for which earlier generations even died. This negative influence makes them vulnerable to go against dharma, not to believe any longer in karma, and it also makes them vulnerable for conversion, if they see material benefits.

It is no virtue not to propagate Hindu Dharma

Hindus sometimes even seem proud that they don’t propagate their faith. It is a false pride and not wise. Christianity and Islam are clever. They explain their good aspects, like strong belief and trust in God or Allah, and strong community support. They also explain why they are closer to the truth. The reason, they say is, that they have one God compared to many Gods in Hinduism. They are right: one source is closer to the truth. The Source must be formless and therefore only One. Unfortunately, most Hindus can’t counter them because, not only do their Muslim and Christian friends not know, but even they themselves don’t know any longer the basic insights of the rishis—the one formless Brahman of the Vedas which is within all of us.

If the Hindu representatives had explained the basics of the Vedas right after Independence in a big way, many of those who had converted to Islam and Christianity might have come back. Anyone who has common sense will come to the conclusion that Hindu Dharma is superior to all three Abrahamic religions, as it is a genuine enquiry and not blind belief in the supremacy of a particular group.

Instead, in the name of ‘harmony’, Hindus downplayed the intellectual superiority of Hindu Dharma and allowed Islam and Christianity to aggressively propagate their religions as “only true” and lure Hindus with a simple formula: there is only one true God and our God is this true God. He is compassionate and loving and has promised that He will look after you, provided you accept him and keep the rules and commandments.

Another positive aspect is stressed: the convert is promised to be part of a strongly bonded brotherhood especially in the case of Islam, but also in the case of Christianity, he will get emotional and financial support from the Church if in distress. Apart from that, since for many Hindus this is not enough reason to forgo their tradition, they lure converts with financial benefits, cheat outright with so-called miracles or frighten simple-minded Hindus with eternal hellfire.

What are the solutions?

Very important is of course that the government does not favour the big and powerful ‘minorities’ of Muslims and Christians. How to achieve this change in a democracy, where everyone is focused mainly on vote banks, needs to be brainstormed.

Apart from the government, Hindu society has a big role to play: First and foremost, the basics of Vedic wisdom need to be made known widely. Schools and universities are a good start and thanks to the New Education Policy, the Indian Knowledge System (IKS) is now indeed taken into educational institutions. There is however a problem: even teachers often don’t know much about the profound philosophy and haven’t done sadhana in their life to discover Atma within. So, they prefer to explain festivals or customs or stories from the Ramayana or Bhagavad Gita.

All this is important, but if the greatest advantage of Hindu Dharma is not clearly explained, students may not be convinced why they should stick to their tradition, especially when they are lured with material benefits and also told that billion humans worldwide see merit in those dogmatic religions. Otherwise, why would there be so many Christians and Muslims in the world?

The most important point and the crucial difference between Hindu Dharma and the Abrahamic religions is that Hindus claim that God is within as Sat-Chit-Ananda (blissful consciousness), and that it can be experienced.

To convey this knowledge effectively, it would need Hindus who have touched their Atma, who know from experience about the oneness of all, because if the truth is conveyed only theoretically, it won’t make an impact. Therefore, sadhana needs to be encouraged and sadhana needs to be the criterion for being able to teach, not academic degrees. Small booklets with sayings of genuine saints like Anandamanyi Ma or Mata Amritanandamayi could be distributed in a big way. They are already available and explain Vedanta philosophy in a simple way. For me personally, meeting Anandamayi Ma had a decisive influence in understanding Vedic wisdom. It was easy to understand because she lived this oneness. Anandamayi Ma once said, “There is no difference between you and me and I don’t see a difference.”

Approach to Indian Christians

The theology of Christianity is a little confusing. On the one hand, it is considered heresy for a Christian to claim that he is one with God, yet on the other hand, the Holy Spirit is supposed to come over him and guide him. And all three—God the Father, Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit—are seen as God. Nowadays, many Christians in the West no longer accept the dogmas of the Church, but take the sayings of Jesus and bhakti as guideline. Therefore, many even claim that God is within, as Jesus himself said “the Kingdom of heaven is within”.

Hindus should point out to Christians those aspects, where Jesus, in contrast to the Church, is in line with the Indian rishis. For example, he made the Upanishadic statement, “I and my Father are one” (Aham Brahmasmi). Unfortunately, and shrewdly, the Church declared that this claim is valid only for Jesus, but this of course doesn’t make sense.

Another point: When once asked what is the most important commandment, Jesus said, that the most important commandment is to love God above everything else. This teaching is recorded in the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke. It means, Jesus was foremost advocating bhakti, the most important path also for Hindus, and for anyone who wants to realise the truth. Yet the Church declared as its first commandment: You shall not have other gods before me, and doesn’t mention the bhakti aspect.

Now in all likelihood, the Christians will counter Hindus and claim, “What the Church means, is that we need to worship the true God, and we, the Christians, have the true God and you, Hindus, have false Gods.”

It needs to be understood first by Hindus themselves and then also conveyed to Indian Christians: Hinduism claims that there is absolute truth, and relative truth. Absolute truth is that which is really true, it means it must be always and self-evident. It means, only God (pure, eternal, unchanging consciousness, Brahman) is really true (it can be logically concluded and experienced). And that consciousness is really the only true, invisible, formless God. All else is Maya, a temporary appearance on this truth. This is of course universally valid and independent by what name one calls that one Truth.

An analogy makes it clear: In a movie hall, the flickering, changing pictures of the movie cover the movie screen. Yet the invisible white screen is the only real thing in the movie, all else, including the people, houses, etc. are temporary appearances whose substance is the one screen. The story of the movie is more like virtual reality. This should make sense nowadays. Even Elon Musk believes that this apparent reality is not the real thing. It follows naturally, that discovering the ‘real thing’ (Brahman) is the goal of life.

The Abrahamic religions do not have this absolute Truth level. Even their great (good) God and its opposite, the (evil) Satan, are within Maya, more in tune with the Devas and Asuras of Hinduism.

We should use the sayings of Jesus which are in tune with Vedanta, to make Indian Christians reflect that the dogmas of the Church are unnecessary and even ridiculous, and that their accusation that Hindus worship false Gods does not apply, simply because only one ‘thing’—not a thing of course—is true and everything is contained in that.

Another point: Often, ordinary Christians are critical of their priests and bishops. I know this from Germany, and it may be the case also in India. Especially the higher clergy may be corrupt—morally and financially. If caught, such news should be spread. It helps to wean away common Christians from the Church.

Approach to Indian Muslims

The previous point that often, the clergy is not living an ideal, but rather an immoral life, is valid also for certain Muslim clergy. It should not be hushed up, but spread in news. It helps ordinary Muslims not to be too much under their sway.

It is probably more difficult to have a sensible dialogue with Muslims. Some Britisher made a valid observation: “While the Hindus sharpen their arguments, the Muslims sharpen their swords.” At present, there is the unfortunate situation, that Muslims are confident that Hindus are afraid of their street power. This needs to change and Muslims need to be afraid that they will pay for instigating violence. Law enforcement agencies need to make them pay, or even Hindus who are not afraid to push them back in street violence.

Once I heard a congress spokesperson say on TV, “what does it matter if one worships Krishna or Christ.” True, it doesn’t matter much, Bhakti is a valid path and all true devotion and prayers reach the One. This is valid for Hindus, Christians and Muslims. But it matters what else those religions demand to believe blindly—for example that Hindus are worshipping demons and will go to hell—and which not only creates discord in the society, but also harms those believers individually, as they don’t follow their conscience which tells them to do the right thing in the given circumstances, but instead blindly “believe absurdities which can make them commit atrocities”, as Voltaire had already observed.

So, first, Hindus themselves need to be solidly grounded in their ancient wisdom through knowledge and sadhana, and second, the unreasonable dogmas of Islam and Christianity need to be fearlessly challenged—possibly even by taking the issue to international bodies like the United Nations. – Maria Wirth Blog, 15 March 2026

› Maria Wirth is a German journalist and author resident in Uttarkhand. She is a Neo-Vedantin and the views expressed in this article are personal. This article first appeared in the Journal for Indian Thought and Policy Research, March 2026.

Why Michel Danino’s scholarship must be cherished and celebrated – Swarajya

March 16, 2026April 10, 2026VOI

A survey of Michel Danino’s work provides context to the widespread unease surrounding the Supreme Court’s adverse remarks about him. – Swarajya Staff

The Supreme Court on 11 March ordered a blacklisting of three experts involved in drafting a controversial chapter on ‘corruption in the judiciary’ for a Class 8 NCERT textbook.

A bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and Vipul Pancholi described the NCERT director’s response as “disturbing” after it emerged the chapter had been rewritten without disclosing details of the new experts or approval processes.

The court directed the Union government and states not to associate with Professor Michel Danino, Suparna Diwakar and Alok Prasanna Kumar, who were involved in drafting the earlier chapter.

An affidavit by NCERT Director Dinesh Prasad Saklani stated that Michel Danino had supervised the drafting of the chapter, whilst educator Suparna Diwakar and legal researcher Alok Prasanna Kumar were also involved in the process.

The bench directed the Union, all states and all institutions receiving state funds to disassociate them from rendering any service which would mean payment from public funds.

The court observed it had “no reason to doubt that Professor Michel Danino along with Ms Diwakar and Mr Alok Prasanna Kumar either does not have reasonable knowledge about Indian judiciary or they deliberately, knowingly misrepresented the facts in order to project a negative image of the Indian judiciary before students of class 8 who are at an impressionable age. “

However, the three individuals can approach the Supreme Court for modification of this order, the court added.

Who is Michel Danino?

Michel Danino, born in 1956 in Honfleur, France, is a French-born Indian author, scholar, and educationist who has lived in India since 1977 and holds Indian citizenship.

Drawn to Indian civilization from his youth, influenced by Sri Aurobindo and Auroville, he settled in India and became a lifelong student of its ancient heritage. A visiting professor at IIT Gandhinagar, where he supports the Archaeological Sciences Centre, Danino has authored key works including The Lost River: On the Trail of the Sarasvati (2010), exploring the Vedic river, and Indian Culture and India’s Future (2011). He has also co-edited textbooks on Indian knowledge traditions and edited Sri Aurobindo and India’s Rebirth (2018).

The Supreme Court’s comments give his critics fresh ammunition to attack him.

Danino has been a target of suspicion in certain academic and media circles for years. The charge is familiar: he writes sympathetically about ancient India’s civilisational achievements, he has defended the physical existence of the Sarasvati river, he has questioned the Aryan invasion theory. This, the accusation runs, makes him a scholar whose conclusions are predetermined by ideology rather than evidence.

Those who make this accusation have, with remarkable consistency, declined to engage with his works.

What the Evidence Actually Looks Like

The Lost River, Danino’s most comprehensive work, is an investigation into the Sarasvati—the river celebrated in the Rig Veda that later texts describe as “disappearing.” The question of whether this river had a physical existence, and if so where, has become entangled in Indian political controversy. Critics therefore treat any scholarly work that argues for its historical reality as ideologically motivated.

What those critics rarely discuss is how Danino builds his case.

The book draws on geological surveys conducted by the Geological Survey of India; on satellite imagery analysed from NASA’s LANDSAT series, France’s SPOT series, and India’s own IRS satellites; on nuclear isotope dating of groundwater samples carried out by scientists at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre; on bore-hole data drilled by American hydrologist Robert Raikes near the Harappan site of Kalibangan; on a 1986–1991 hydrogeological survey of the Cholistan Desert conducted by two German scientists, M.A. Geyh and D. Ploethner; and on remote-sensing research published by three scientists of the Indian Space Research Organisation.

This is before one counts the 19th-century British surveyors, the French CNRS mission of the 1980s, the American and Japanese researchers, and the Indian archaeologists whose fieldwork Danino synthesises across more than 400 pages.

The accusation of ideological bias is, in other words, being levelled at a book whose evidentiary base spans four continents, two centuries of scholarship, and at least six scientific disciplines.

Satellite imagery from a NASA programme does not adjust its findings based on Indian political conditions. German isotope hydrology does not take instructions from the RSS. Either the geology is sound or it is not—and critics who wish to challenge Danino’s conclusions are obliged to say which data they dispute and why.

The Quality That Distinguishes a Scholar from an Ideologue

There is a further dimension of Danino’s work that his critics have chosen to overlook: his explicit, consistent acknowledgement of uncertainty and dissent.

In the prologue to The Lost River, he writes that whatever perspective his readers choose to adopt, he will be satisfied if they feel enriched by the inquiry.

In the body of the book, he returns repeatedly to scholars who hold different views, notes where the evidence is genuinely contested, and presents his own synthesis as a reasoned interpretation rather than an unchallengeable verdict. “We will hear diverse viewpoints,” he writes, “learn from every one of them, and I will present my own, while weighing and trying to reconcile inputs from a variety of disciplines.”

This is not a rhetorical formula. It is borne out in practice. Danino does not suppress inconvenient findings. He discusses the minority of scholars who have questioned whether the Vedic Sarasvati was located in India at all, or whether it existed as a physical river.

He engages with their arguments before offering his rebuttal. He flags, more than once, the limits of what the evidence can establish. He distinguishes between what is demonstrated, what is probable, and what remains speculative.

A partisan sophist does not do this. An intellectual demagogue selects evidence, suppresses alternatives, and presents conclusions with a certainty the record does not support. Danino does the opposite—and the contrast with the certainty his critics bring to their dismissals of him is, in itself, telling.

The Argument His Critics Would Rather Not Have

Perhaps the most uncomfortable dimension of Danino’s scholarship—uncomfortable, specifically, for those who accuse him of serving a political agenda—is that his sharpest criticism is directed not at ancient India’s detractors but at the Indian state’s failure to take its own intellectual heritage seriously.

In an article in The Hindu in 2015, Danino notes that no Indian university has a department dedicated to the history of science. He notes that the best online resource for India’s classical mathematicians—a tradition that includes Aryabhata, Brahmagupta, Bhaskaracharya, Mahavira, and Narayana Pandita—is maintained not by an Indian institution but by the University of St Andrews in Scotland.

He notes that significant research contributions to the field in recent decades have come from scholars in the United States, France, Japan, and New Zealand, while their Indian counterparts have worked, in his words, “with little or no institutional support.”

This is not a celebration of ancient India’s greatness. It is a damning audit of post-Independence India’s intellectual priorities. If his agenda were simply to flatter a political constituency, he would not write this. He writes it because it is true, and because a scholar whose subject is being neglected has an obligation to say so regardless of whose discomfort it causes.

The same essay makes an argument that deserves to be read in full by everyone who has dismissed Danino as a partisan. He argues that mainstream Indian historiography’s silence on India’s genuine scientific and mathematical achievements—its failure to give Brahmagupta or Sushruta the space it gives to kings and dynasties—has created the vacuum that fantasists have filled.

The absurd claims about ancient aircraft and Vedic nuclear weapons that embarrass serious scholars arise, at least partly, from a historiography that has told Indian students their civilisation produced nothing worth studying.

Danino’s prescription is not mythologising. It is rigour: document the real achievements, teach them properly, and there will be no room left for the fabrications.

A scholar who builds his case on German groundwater surveys, NASA satellite data, and French archaeological missions is not producing ideology. A scholar who acknowledges competing viewpoints, flags the limits of evidence, and invites his readers to draw their own conclusions is not producing propaganda. A scholar who criticises his own country’s institutions for neglecting the very field he is defending is not writing to please a political master.

In the same way, a scholar who included a section on problems with one of India’s most important institutions in a school textbook is only enabling informed civic understanding among young students. – Swarajya, 16 March 2026

VOICE OF INDIA

History Politics Science Religion

Author VOI

Tagore’s Jana Gana Mana: How a British lie became India’s most persistent myth – Samik Bhattacharya

2 – Was India’s knowledge elitist? – Michel Danino

1 – India as a knowledge creator – Michel Danino

Confronting the many faces of Hinduphobia in the West – Arun Anand

The sacred fire at Baku – Sandeep Balakrishna

Manusmriti: Between prescription and practice – Prajesh Panikkar

Marxism vs Buddhism: The next battlefield in Tibet – Claude Arpi

Statement Affirming the Continuation of the Institution of Dalai Lama – Office of the Dalai Lama – Dharamsala – July 2, 2025

West’s 100-year-old dream of a Christian nation in South Asia – Sumit Ahlawat

The Issue of Conversion: Challenges before Hindu Society – Maria Wirth

Why Michel Danino’s scholarship must be cherished and celebrated – Swarajya

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