Radicalisation: The anatomy of a modern Muslim extremist – Zeba Zoariah

Madrasa Students

Radicalisation today is not an event but an architecture. And India’s survival depends on recognising that the threat is no longer the gun alone—it is the idea, the influencer, the institution, and the politician who allows the idea to breathe. – Zeba Zoariah

Radicalisation in India has never been a single fire to extinguish; today, it is an entire electrical grid sparking at once. Kashmir, the North-East, university campuses, social media echo chambers, Pakistan’s propaganda ecosystem, and China’s strategic ambitions are no longer parallel problems—they are interlinked circuits in a larger architecture of destabilisation. Recent events—the Pahalgam massacre, the Red Fort bomber, Sharjeel Imam’s Siliguri thesis, banned secessionist literature, TRF’s resurgence, and Pakistan’s open admission of cross-border strikes—paint a picture far more complex than insurgency or alienation. What we are facing is a hybrid radicalisation system, where the terrorist with a rifle, the scholar with a footnote, the Opposition leader with a microphone, and the foreign intelligence officer with a map contribute to the same ideological continuum.

To understand how this system works, we must begin with the Pahalgam attack, where victims were separated by religion, forced to recite the kalima, and some inspected for circumcision. This was not militancy born of grievance; this was religious purification violence, consistent with Lashkar-e-Taiba’s early doctrinal manuals recovered by Indian agencies in the 1990s and 2000s. TRF—Lashkar’s “clean-skin” rebrand created after FATF scrutiny—now uses digital cells for recruitment, AI-edited training videos, and encrypted transit maps. The 2025 attack fits the global pattern identified by the UN Monitoring Team: terror groups increasingly outsource field operations to hybrid outfits while preserving ideological continuity.

India’s response, Operation Sindoor, signalled a doctrinal transformation. No denials. No ambiguity. A named, calibrated, precision retaliatory strike—the kind military strategists call “limited compellence operations”.

This is India borrowing from Israel’s and France’s playbook: when the adversary uses non-state proxies, the response hits the infrastructure, not the foot soldier. But militancy is no longer the strategic centre of gravity; ideas are.

Enter the white-collar jihadist—the Red Fort bomber, a doctor and academic, radicalised not in a madrassa but in encrypted theological forums. This mirrors the Western jihadist wave (2014–2017), where ISIS recruits were more educated than average, as per a World Bank study. India is now confronting the same sociology: the radical is not poor, not fringe, and not uninformed. He is confident, literate, and ideologically “purified”. His job isn’t to fight, but to make extremism appear intellectually defensible.

This ideological laundering is aided by the intellectual-apologist class, India’s third radicalisation engine. Their vocabulary is polished; their sentences are footnoted; their politics is aestheticised. But their function is brutally simple:

  • erase Pakistan’s culpability,
  • securitise the Indian state (Copenhagen School theory),
  • convert extremists into victims,
  • disguise secession as scholarship.

The recent ban on 25 books—many of them treating Kashmir primarily through narratives of separatism and grievance, without substantial reference to the Pandit exodus or terrorist recruitment and financing networks—exposed this narrative-laundering machinery. Predictably, the outrage was largely performative: minimal substantive engagement with the texts, and immediate claims of “censorship” rather than debate.

But ideological laundering alone cannot destabilise a nation. It requires a political amplifier. This is where the INDIA bloc enters the picture. Instead of countering radicalisation, large sections of the Opposition have made it a political currency. The Sharjeel Imam case illustrates this perfectly. Imam’s call to “cut off the Siliguri Corridor” is not dissent; it is a geopolitical strike plan. The corridor—a 22-km-wide bottleneck—is India’s only physical link to its North-East. Since the 1970s, Pakistan’s ISI has discussed this vulnerability in intercepted communications; China studies it through its “Five Fingers of Tibet” doctrine; and Bangladesh-based radicals have referenced it in training manuals. Imam’s articulation mirrors these inputs almost word for word.

And yet, the Opposition converted a national security case into a communal morality play: “Muslims do not get bail.” This is not analysis; it is narrative weaponisation. When the political class refuses to differentiate between dissent and doctrinal destabilisation, they are not defending civil liberties—they are endorsing strategic fragmentation. Which brings us to the uncomfortable question: does the Opposition still see India as a single nation or a negotiable federation of convenience? Because every time they defend secessionist ideology as free thought, or minimise Islamist extremism as “alienation,” they signal to adversarial states that national unity itself is an open debate.

To fully grasp the scale of India’s challenge, one must zoom out to the North-East, where radicalisation is increasingly tied to transnational agendas. AQIS modules have been discovered in Assam; madrassa networks linked to Bangladesh’s radical outfits have been quietly expanding digital influence; socio-economic vulnerabilities are exploited through identity politics; and demographic shifts in border districts feed new anxieties. The Siliguri Corridor is not merely a highway; it is the hinge of India’s territorial integrity. Any discourse—academic, activist, or political—that imagines its blockade as dissent is not freedom of expression; it is geo-strategic sabotage.

This is why India’s understanding of radicalisation must shift from “counter-insurgency” to “ecosystem disruption”. In counter-terror literature, this is called disaggregating the architecture

  • the operative node (the terrorist),
  • the ideological node (the educated radical),
  • the narrative node (the apologist),
  • the political node (the amplifier),
  • the geopolitical node (the foreign beneficiary).

India’s current policies target only the first node. The other four operate freely—sometimes subtly, sometimes brazenly—and increasingly under political protection.

As a Muslim, I must address the moral dimension. The greatest disservice to Indian Muslims is not done by the government but by those who pretend radicalisation does not exist. They infantilise Muslims, treat ideology as emotion, selectively quote scripture, misuse historical grievances, and weaponise identity for political mileage. This is not solidarity; it is manipulation. Radicalisation rejects the Constitution. The apologist ecosystem rejects accountability. But both claim to represent us. We must reject both.

So where does India go from here? Certainly not towards censorship alone, because censorship without clarity creates martyrs. Nor towards unrestrained policing, because enforcement without narrative wins battles but loses generations.

What India needs is a national hybrid anti-radicalisation doctrine:

  • mapping ideological ecosystems with the same seriousness as terrorist cells;
  • distinguishing dissent from secessionism with constitutional precision;
  • regulating foreign-funded intellectual networks with transparency;
  • integrating Kashmir and North-East intelligence grids;
  • building Muslim-led theological counter-narratives;
  • calling out political actors who treat national unity as a bargaining chip.

Because ultimately, India’s greatest vulnerability is not the terrorist who crosses the border. It is the leader who crosses the line between opposition and opportunism.

Radicalisation today is not an event but an architecture. And India’s survival depends on recognising that the threat is no longer the gun alone—it is the idea, the influencer, the institution, and the politician who allows the idea to breathe.

The question, then, is not whether India can defeat terrorism. It is whether India can defeat those who manufacture the conditions for it. – News18, 17 December 2025

Zeba Zoariah is a practising advocate. She writes articles on women’s rights, politics and law.

Cicero Quote

Vande Mataram: How an anti-British song became ‘anti-Muslim’ – Ibn Khaldun Bharati

Bankim Chandra Chatterjee

In the Islamic political praxis, Muslims are nationalist if they are in majority and the rule is theirs. But if they can’t rule the country, they can’t be nationalist either. – Ibn Khaldun Bharati

The Muslim opposition to Vande Mataram is well known. However, the reason behind it is not well understood. Actually, it’s beyond comprehension. Their objection to the national song is formulated in such abstruse theological terms that even an educated Muslim can’t grasp its esoteric nuance. In reality, it’s not so much an opposition to the song as to the idea behind it—the idea of India as a nation. It’s the idea that Hindus and Muslims become an organic whole to form an inseparable political community. The major Muslim ideologues insisted on their separateness, and separate they remain.

To say that saying Vande Mataram (Salutations, Oh Mother) evokes the imagery of idol worship is the kind of convoluted reasoning that defies common sense. Furthermore, to emphasise that the hostility to idol worship is the foundational creed of Islam, and that it’s incumbent on every Muslim to wear this abhorrence on sleeve, isn’t really conducive to diversity, pluralism, peaceful coexistence, and composite nationhood—the ideals in which the Muslims have greater stake than anyone else.

Recently, Maulana Mahmood Madani, the head of the largest organisation of ulema in India, Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind, made a controversial speech, in which he stressed the imperative of jihad in India. He also said, “Murda qaumen mushkilaat mein mubtala nahin hotin. Wo to surrender kar deti hain. Wo kahenge ke Vande Mataram padho to padhna shuru kar denge.” (Dead communities don’t face any difficulty since they surrender readily. When asked to chant Vande Mataram, they willingly do that).

The ferocity with which these Muslims proclaim their revulsion for Vande Mataram, and the grim determination with which they threaten to go to war if its public singing were to be revived, makes one wonder if there is actually something so repugnant in the song that a Muslim can’t countenance it if he were to remain true to his faith.

Is there a problem?

Let’s see if there is anything in Vande Mataram that makes Muslims recoil in horror. Arif Mohammed Khan, the scholarly Governor of Bihar, translated into Urdu the two stanzas that have the status of the national song, and sent the same to one of the most prominent Islamic seminaries, the Nadwa, at Lucknow, for their opinion on it; specifically asking if there was anything in it that was contrary to Islam.

It was presented as an original composition, and not a translation. He had rendered the key words, Vande Mataram, as “Taslimaat, Maa, Taslimaat”. The ulema at Nadwa opined that there was nothing in the song that contravened Islam. One, however, suspects that if they knew it to be the translation of Vande Mataram, they might have had a different opinion. Such is politics and such is the power of narrative!

The reality behind the narrative

The root of the Sanskrit word ‘vande’ is ‘vand’. According to Sanskritist Monier Monier-Williams, depending on the context, ‘vand’ means “to praise, celebrate, laud, extol, to show honour, do homage, salute respectfully; or, venerate, worship, adore”. The primary meaning is not worship; certainly, not the ritual worship. Even if it were, hasn’t Urdu poetry been more extravagant in such expressions. For example, Iqbal, the poet of Islamic revivalism, in one of his earlier poems, said, “Khaak-e watan ka mujhko har zarra devta hai” (Every particle of the country is a god unto me)”. Iqbal’s fans—quite a few of them being fundamentalist fanatics—never saw anything amiss in this.

Can there be a nation without a motherland?

As for mataram, i.e., mother—Mother India—Urdu has a beautiful term, madar-e-watan, the motherland. No Muslim ever found this concept contrary to Islam. In fact, the most literal and yet most exquisite rendition of Vande Mataram has been A.R. Rahman’s song Maa Tujhe Salaam.

There are numerous verses in the Quran (7:12, 23:12, 30:20, etc.) which say that we are made of earth, and it is the source of life and the place of origin. It’s implied that, in a deeper sense, the earth is the mother, and one’s own place is the motherland.

In a display of genius that is peculiar to them, the Muslim leaders espied the idol of a deity in the conception of motherland, and flinched from its adoration. Even in Pakistan—which broke away from us, on difference over the Indian nationhood, and the sacredness of the motherland—Asim Munir, the generalissimo, can be seen referring to his country as motherland.

Nowhere else in the world do Muslims have had any problem with the concepts of nationalism and the sacredness of the respective countries. The literal translation of the word ‘Pakistan’ is holy land, which in Hindi translates as punya bhumi. The Indian Muslims, however, can’t accord this status to their own country.

In the Islamic political praxis, Muslims are nationalist if they are in majority, and the rule is theirs. But if they can’t rule the country, they can’t be nationalist either. In a debate that raged between poet Muhammad Iqbal and Jawaharlal Nehru, the former candidly said, “In majority countries Islam accommodates nationalism; for there Islam and nationalism are practically identical; in minority countries it is justified in seeking self-determination as a cultural unit”. (Modern Review, Calcutta, 1934-35)

There’s a deeper reality. Without recognising the country as the motherland, there can’t be a nation. But can the people who came as invaders, conquered the country, and ruled it for centuries, ever accord the status of mother to the vanquished territory? Could the British ever regard India as mother?

The Muslim ideology has been in the hands of the elite descended from the old ruling class. The Muslim masses follow it uncritically because it’s couched in religious idiom, and religion is not to be questioned.

Is Anandmath anti-Muslim?

Regarding Vande Mataram being a part of the novel Anandmath; well, it’s true that the poem, though independently written, has been interpolated in the book. It’s also true that the theme of the book is the Sannyasi Rebellion of 1770s, which was an uprising against the oppressive Muslim rule, and therefore, some passages have clear anti–Muslim overtones. But isn’t it equally true that those Muslim rulers were oppressors, and their religious hostility toward the Hindu peasants was an added factor in oppression? So, why shouldn’t the rebellion against them be seen as a class war of the oppressed against the oppressors, and the fulmination against them should be seen in perspective, and not misconstrued as invective against ordinary Muslims who belonged to the same class as them? Haven’t we seen this kind of class analysis about the Moplah “Rebellion”?

But, it’s not possible despite the fact that a large number of Marxist historians have been Muslim. That’s because, these historians, when it suits them, treat Muslims as a monolith, ignoring their socioeconomic diversities. Thus, a justified diatribe against the Nawabi system is seen as a tirade against ordinary Muslims. What if Indian Christians were to see in the criticism of the British rule the condemnation of ordinary Christians?

By the way, no Indian ever rejected the popular patriotic song Saare Jahan Se Achha just because it’s from the pen of Iqbal, the separatist ideologue.

The genesis

Vande Mataram, set to tune by Rabindranath Tagore, had been sung in the Congress sessions since 1896. No Muslim leader ever found it antithetical to their religion. Even during the Swadeshi Movement, which was a response to the Partition of Bengal (1905), when this song became the anthem of resistance to the British, one doesn’t hear of any objection to its purported polytheistic imagery. This was despite the fact the division of Bengal was on religious lines, and it supposedly favoured the Muslim majority of East Bengal. Even Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the great Islamic scholar and thinker, who claims to have joined the underground revolutionary movement of the Bengali youth, doesn’t record any religious objections to it.

Even during the Khilafat Movement (1919-24), when the Congress was working on pan-Islamist agenda, Vande Mataram continued to be sung in its gatherings, in the presence of the leading Khilafatist maulanas, who, then, dominated its proceedings.

How an anti-British song became ‘anti-Muslim’

From 1896 to 1937, Vande Mataram was the staple for the Congress. And then, elections were held under the Government of India Act, 1935; and Congress ministries were formed in provinces. After centuries, the natives of India, the Hindus, were in power. The Muslim ruling class could endure British rule, but seeing their former subjects becoming rulers was beyond their endurance. For centuries, they had been conditioned to look down upon the Hindus, and now the same Hindus were ministers. They freaked out, and began hallucinating about the Hindu oppression. As they upped the ante for a desperate fight, their glance fell upon the “Durga” and “Lakshmi” in Vande Mataram, and the Islam-in-danger bogey became ever more palpable.

This situation has been best summarised by a nationalist Muslim, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai. In a statement that was published in The Pioneer on 19 October 1937, that merits in-extenso reproduction, he said, “Mr. Jinnah characterises Vande Mataram as an anti-Islamic song. Mr Jinnah had been a devoted and enthusiastic member of the Congress and of its chief executive, the All-India Congress Committee, for a number of years. Every year, the session of the Congress opened with the singing of this song, and every year he was seen on the platform listening to the song with the attention of a devotee. Did he ever protest? Mr Jinnah left the Congress, not because he thought the Vande Mataram was an anti-Islamic song, but because he had found the idea of swaraj unacceptable.”

Nehru is both Churchill and Chamberlain

The Muslim League, having suffered a rout in the 1937 elections, and further failing to force its way into the government in the United Provinces—not on the basis of the seats won, but as an entitlement for having once been the rulers—suddenly realised that Vande Mataram was idolatrous, and raised a war cry against it.

In the book Vande Mataram: The Biography of a Song, historian Sabyasachi Bhattacharya details the debates in the Congress, and the correspondence between Nehru, Bose, and Rabindranath Tagore. Nehru’s first reaction was: “The present outcry against Bande Mataram is to a large extent a manufactured one by the communalists.” However, soon, in order to appease the communalists, he said that having read the English translation of Anandmath, he was of the opinion that it was “likely to irritate the Muslims”. And so, he set out “to meet real grievances where they exist(ed).” That is how the Congress Working Committee, on 26 October 1937 (just days after Kidwai’s remonstrance), decided to truncate the song, and adopt only the first two stanzas as they were “unobjectionable”.

Such bending backward before the communalists recalls to mind what Atal Bihari Vajpayee once told Nehru about the streak of appeasement in him: “In you, there are both Churchill and Chamberlain”.

Sabyasachi Bhattacharya narrates how this concession couldn’t satisfy the Muslim League, as they insisted on the deletion of Vande Mataram in toto. Jinnah wrote, “Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru cannot be unaware that Muslims all over have refused to accept the Vande Mataram or any expurgated edition of the anti-Muslim song as a binding National Anthem”.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is right in his analysis that the mutilation of Vande Mataram whetted the appetite of the Muslim League, and became the prelude to the partition of India. It is in the logic of appeasement that instead of resolving an issue, it exacerbates it.

Even now, the Muslim leadership remains as staunchly against Vande Mataram as it was during Jinnah’s time. So, what is gained by cutting out the better part of the song; and, what’s been gained by acquiescing to the partition?

The way forward

Since 2014, because of the conducive atmosphere provided, the Muslims have been showing an unprecedented fondness for the Constitution, and the sacred symbols of the nation. The Independence and Republic Days are celebrated with gaiety in Muslim institutions, including madrasas; and the national anthem is sung with gusto. Many a time, one can see the national flag waving from the high minaret of a mosque. If a better atmosphere is conduced, the Muslims will sing Vande Mataram with as much fervour as anyone else. – The Print, 12 December 2025

Ibn Khaldun Bharati is a student of Islam, and looks at Islamic history from an Indian perspective. 

Chhattisgarh Waqf Board orders all mosques and madrasas to hoist the Indian flag on Independence Day.